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Abstract
In the independent-private-value model, we allow resale among bidders
following a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid, or English auction
with two bidders. We consider two reg i m e sw i t hr e g a r dt ot h ed i s c l o s u r e
of the sealed bids: full disclosure and no disclosure. Either the auction
winner or the auction loser chooses the resale mechanism. Thanks to three
key properties our model shares with the common-value model, we obtain
explicit formulas for the equilibria. We circumvent the “ratchet eﬀect,” by
“randomizing” every pure equilibrium under no disclosure into an equivalent
behavioral equilibrium under full disclosure. We compare the auctioneer’s
revenues across auctions and bargaining procedures. We present some n-
bidder extensions.
1. Introduction
Because resale is at least possible after many real-life auctions, we add to
the independent-private-value model a post-auction stage where resale under
incomplete information may take place between bidders. We consider two
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1regimes regarding the disclosure of sealed bids: full disclosure, or FD, where
the auctioneer reveals all bids before resale, and no disclosure, of ND, where
the auctioneer defers the publication of the bids and the auction payments,
which may be linked to the bids, until after resale. Although unrealistic for
the second-price auction, or SPA, the ND regime is worth studying because
it provides equilibria that can be transformed into equilibria under the FD
regime. The auction winner in the general case or the only loser when there
are two bidders chooses and implements a secondary auction. The bidders
are risk-neutral and do not discount their future payoﬀs2.
Under FD, bidders engage in signalling through their bids. Because of a
“ratchet eﬀect,” no perfect Bayesian equilibrium, or PBE, where the bidders
follow diﬀerent strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable bidding functions exists
when there are two bidders. Consequently, no fully-separating PBE exists in
the ﬁrst price auction, or FPA, with exante heterogeneous bidders, since only
diﬀerent bidding functions could possibly satisfy the bidders’—diﬀerent—ﬁrst-
order conditions, or FOC’s. In the SPA with arbitrary bidders, the only
separating PBE is the only symmetric separating PBE: the truth-bidding
PBE; although, because of the possibility of resale, it is not an equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies (on this point, see, for example, Gupta and
Lebrun, 1999).
Under ND, because bidders cannot directly signal through their bids3,
there exist one pure separating PBE of the FPA and a multiplicity of such
equilibria of the SPA. We single out the three properties of our model that al-
low to explicitly characterize the PBE’s through methods from the literature
on the common-value model .
Through a “randomization procedure,” we transform every PBE under
ND into an equivalent semi-separating PBE under FD. The procedure con-
sists in having the resale-price taker along the equilibrium path, that is, the
2The results can be extended to the case of arbitrary common discounting with no
consumption between auction and resale (see Footnote 6).
3They can signal only indirectly, through winning or losing the auction.
2less (more) aggressive bidder when the auction winner (loser) sets the same
resale price, randomize over a range of bids in such a way that the other
bidder sets the resale price he would have chosen had the bids stayed secret.
It produces strategies to which again the methods from the common-value
model apply. There exists no other PBE’s that satisfy some assumptions of
monotonicity, “full support,” and diﬀerentiability.
With two exante homogeneous bidders, the PBE of the FPA and the
truth-bidding PBE of the SPA bring the same revenues, which are higher
than the revenues from any other PBE’s of the SPA. With two exante
heterogeneous bidders, some PBE’s of the SPA give higher revenues, and
some others lower revenues.
Changing the resale-price maker from the auction loser to the auction
winner increases the auctioneer’s expected revenues. Under some assump-
tions, the same change does not aﬀect the range of equilibrium revenues from
the SPA.
We extend our results to a family of hybrid auctions, the (k1,k 2)-price
auctions.
With n bidders and the auction winner who chooses the resale mecha-
nism, we construct PBE’s of the English auction, or EA, by having bidders
i nt h es t a g e sl e a d i n gt ot h el a s ts t a g ed r o pw h e nt h ep r i c er e a c h e st h e i rv a l -
ues and having the two bidders remaining at the last stage follow one of the
PBE’s of the SPA with resale between them.
For the FPA with n bidders, the FOC’s and boundary conditions provide
an implicit characterization that is amenable to the methods developed for
the FPA with no resale and heterogenous bidders. We prove the existence
and uniqueness of a diﬀerentiable FPA in a “partial-disclosure” regime when
there are one “strong” bidder and n − 1 “weak” and homogeneous bidders.
The strong bidder’s bidding function is smaller and his bid distribution is
larger. The randomization procedure produces a behavioral PBE of the
FPA under FD where the strong bidder randomizes over a range of bids.
3We ﬁnally compare the PBE of the FPA with the PBE’s of the EA.
2. The ND Regime
2.1 Theorem 1
One item is being auctioned to one of two risk-neutral bidders, bidder 1
and bidder 2, through a sealed-bid FPA or SPA with reserve price c,m a n d a -
tory participation, and the fair tie-breaking rule4. At the unique resale
stage5, which immediately follows the auction6, either the auction winner or
the auction loser makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other bidder. We
ﬁrst assume, in this section and the next, that the auction winner proposes
the resale price. Only the identity of the winner is made public after the
auction and before resale.
The bidders’ values for their own consumptions of the item are private and
independently distributed over the interval7 [c,d],w i t hc<d ,a c c o r d i n gt o
absolutely continuous probability measures F1 and F2 with density functions
f1 and f2 that are strictly positive and continuous8.W e u s e t h e s a m e
notations F1 and F2 for the cumulative distribution functions and assume






We call the (seller’s) optimal-resale-price function ρs the function whose
value at (w1,w 2) in [c,d]
2 is the resale price that maximizes the expected
4Our equilibria remain equilibria under voluntary participation and any tie-breaking
rule. The results about the SPA easily extend to an arbitrary binding reserve price.
5Alternatively, resale may occur at further stages and the resale-price maker has the
ability to commit. A take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer as in the text is then the resale-price maker’s
optimal “transparent” mechanism (see Section 7).
6Or, equivalently, the bidders use the same discount factor δ =1 . If, instead, bidders
use the same discount factor δ<1 and resale and consumption occur T periods after the
auction rather than immediately following it, the results go through by multiplying all
bids by δ
T.
7The results straightforwardly extend to value intervals with diﬀerent upper extremi-
ties. See Footnotes 18 and 32.
8For many results, these assumptions too can be loosened, for example, to allow den-
sity functions that are deﬁned and strictly positive only over (c,d] (as long as they are
bounded).
4payoﬀ of bidder k with value wk when he initially owns the item and bidder
l’s value is distributed according to the restriction of Fl to [c,wl],w h e r ewk
and wl are the lower and higher components of (w1,w 2),t h a ti s ,ρs (w1,w 2)
is the solution to the equation below:
wk = ρ
s (w1,w 2) −
Fl(wl) − Fl(ρs (w1,w 2))
fl(ρs (w1,w 2))
,( 1 )
with k and l such that {k,l} = {1,2} and wk ≤ wl.T h a t e q u a t i o n ( 1 ) h a s
a unique solution follows from the continuity and strict monotonicity of the
virtual-value functions. We denote ρs
i the function ρs with bidder i’s value
as the ﬁrst argument, that is: ρs
1 (v,w)=ρs
2 (w,v)=ρs (v,w).
A strategy of bidder i includes a bidding strategy βi (.)—a (measurable)
bidding function, if the strategy is pure—and a (measurable) resale-price func-
tion γi (.;.).I f b i d d e r i with value vi follows (βi,γi),h eb i d sβi (vi) at auction
and makes at resale the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at the price γi (vi;bi) when
he has won the auction with the bid bi. We assume that a bidder accepts
a resale price if and only if it is not larger than his value. We call PBE
any couple of strategies (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) that can be completed into a PBE9.
When βi is a strictly increasing bidding function, we take the value of its
inverse, which we denote αi,t ob ed over bids above its range.
In Theorem 1 below, for all i 6= j, when bidder j follows a strictly increas-
ing and continuous bidding function such that βj (c)=c,b i d d e ri follows,
after winning, the following resale-price function:
γi (v;b)=ρ
s
i (v,max(v,αj (b))),( 2 )
for all (v,b) in [c,d]×[c,+∞).F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of ρs
i, γi (v;b) is optimal
for bidder i according to his revised beliefs, which the conditional of Fj on
[c,αj (b)] represents.
9By adding beliefs as functions of the past observed histories.
5Hafalir and Krishna (2008) prove10 Theorem 1 (ii). Our methods of proof,
which we develop in the next section, work across auction procedures and
disclosure regimes and hence provide an alternative proof to this part of the
theorem.
Theorem 1:
(i) SPA: If ϕ be a strictly increasing continuous function over [c,d] such









for all v in [c,d],a n dγ1,γ2 are as in (2), then (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) is a PBE of















i =1 ,2,a n dγ1,γ2 are as in (2), then (β1,γ1;β2,γ2) is a PBE of the FPA




Moreover, β1,β2 are the unique bidding functions part of a pure PBE that are,
over (c,d], strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable, and such that β1 (c)=β2 (c)=
c.
10They even prove the uniqueness among all pure and nondecreasing PBE’s.
6From Gupta and Lebrun (1999), the equilibrium bidding functions (3)
in the FPA are the same as in the simple model where private information
becomes public before resale and the resale price is exogenously determined
from the values according to ρs. Also from Gupta and Lebrun (1999), the
same bid distributions arise at the equilibrium of the symmetric model where









,f o ra l lq in [0,1].
We will illustrate most of our results with the two examples below, where
ϕ = α2β1.
Example 1-Bidder 1 is everywhere more aggressive (Figure 1): β1 (v) >
β2 (v) and hence ϕ(v) >v ,f o ra l lv in (c,d). I nt h eF P A ,t h i si st h ec a s ei f
and only if F1 (v) >F 2 (v) over (c,d), that is, when F2 ﬁrst-order (strictly)
stochastically dominates F1.
Example 2-The bidding functions cross once (Figure 2): β1 (v) >β 2 (v)
and ϕ(v) >v ,f o ra l lv in (c,z); β1 (z)=β2 (z) and ϕ(z)=z;a n dβ1 (v) <
β2 (v) and ϕ(v) <v ,f o ra l lv in (z,d). This is the case in the FPA if, for
example, F2 second-order stochastically dominates F1.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume β1,β2 are the strictly increasing and continuous bidding functions
the bidders are expected to follow. Bidder i derives some expected utility
u
s,w
i (gross of the auction price) from winning and some utility u
s,l
i from
losing. Since bidder j, j 6= i, does not observe bi when he makes an oﬀer
at resale, bidder i’s utility u
s,l
i from losing does not depend on bi and we







dFj (vj) with respect to the status quo of
















i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))),i fn o tl a r g e rt h a nvj;(5)
= ρ
s
j (vj,max(vj,α i (bj))), if not larger than vi;(6)
= vi, otherwise.(7)
When resale could take place at the price one of the two bidders would
oﬀer, bidder i’s net value is equal to the resale price. Otherwise, bidder i’s
net value is, as when resale is forbidden, equal to his value. The net values
are endogenous since they depend on the inverses of the bidding functions
β1,β2.
Because bidder i’s bid bi can enter his net value only as an argument
of his resale price, which he chooses optimally, b0















dFj (vj).( 8 )
By an envelope theorem (see Appendix 1), we ﬁnd Lemma 1 (i) below, which
is the formal expression of the lack of a ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a bid change on
the expected payoﬀ through the resale price and allows us to focus on the net
value for identical bids. Lemma 1 (ii) comes from the correction by resale of
any ineﬃcient allocation after a tie, which follows from the obvious inequality
ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) ≤ max(α1 (b),α 2 (b)). The monotonicity in Lemma 1 (iii)11
comes from the monotonicity of the reseller’s optimal resale price with respect
to his value.
Lemma 1:
(i) (no direct ﬁrst-order eﬀe c to fo w nb i d ) F o ra l l(vi,b i) in [c,d]×


















vi,v j;βj (vj),βj (vj);βi,βj
¢
dFj (vj).
(ii) (common net value for common bid) For all b ≥ c,
u
s
1 (α1 (b),α 2 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=u
s
2 (α2 (b),α 1 (b);b,b;β1,β2)=ρ
s (α1 (b),α 2 (b)).






decreasing with respect to vi in [c,d] and continuous with respect to b ≥ c.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
To simplify the notation, we drop β1,β2 from the arguments of us
i.T h e -
orem 1 follows easily from the properties in Lemma 1. Indeed, from Lemma
1 (i), bidder i’s expected net payoﬀs (net of the auction price) when his value


























bdFj (vj).( 1 0 )
Since, at an equilibrium, b should be optimal if vi = αi (b),w eo b t a i nf r o m
9Lemma 1 (ii) and (iii) the FOC’s (11) and (12)12 below:
SPA: ρ




lnFi (αi (b)) =
1
ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) − b
, i =1 ,2.( 1 2 )
The bidding functions in Theorem 1 (i) satisfy (11) and, from Gupta and
Lebrun (1999), those in Theorem 1 (ii) form the unique solution to the two
conditions (12)13. These FOC’s together with the “second-order” condition—
Lemma 3 (iii)—imply that any bidder’s expected net payoﬀ reaches its maxi-








,v j;βj (vj),βj (vj)
¢
, the integrand in (9) is nonnega-
tive when αjβi (vi) >v j, nonpositive otherwise, and the integral is maximized
at b = βi (vi).F o r b ≤ βi (vi), the derivative (us
i (vi,α j (b);b,b) − b) d
dbFj (αj (b))−
Fj (αj (b)) of (10) is not smaller than its value—zero—at vi = αi (b). Similarly,
t h ed e r i v a t i v ei sn o n p o s i t i v ef o rb ≥ βi (vi).T h e o r e m 1 i s p r o v e d .
2.3. Properties of the PBE’s
Assume that, in the PBE (β1,γ1;β2,γ2),b i d d e ri is less aggressive at
his value v,t h a ti s ,βi (v) <β j (v).L e t [ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)] be the maximum
interval including v such that bidder i is less aggressive everywhere in its
interior. By continuity, the bidding functions coincide at the extremities
and we have:
ϕ
− (v)=m a x {w ∈ [c,v]|ϕ(w)=w}
ϕ
+ (v)=m i n {w ∈ [v,d]|ϕ(w)=w},
12The same FOC’s (12) for the FPA would follow from any other choice of optimal resale-
oﬀer functions. If a resale-oﬀer function ρi is optimal, it must satisfy ρi (αi (b),α j (b)) =
ρs
i (αi (b),α j (b)) if αi (b) <α j (b).A l o n g a P B E , i f αi (b)=αj (b), whether resale occurs
or not, both bidders’ net values for winning are equal to αi (b)=αj (b),w h i c hi sa l s oe q u a l
to ρs
i (αi (b),α j (b)).
13With the immediate boundary condition β1 (d)=β2 (d).
10where ϕ = α2β1. Everywhere in the interior of the bid interval [βi (ϕ− (v)),βi (ϕ+ (v))],
we have αi (b) >α j (b).
Denote r the function ρs (α1 (.),α 2 (.)).B i d d e r i’s equilibrium bid βi (v)
belongs14 to the interior of the subinterval15 [βi(ϕ− (v)),r−1 (v)] of [βi (ϕ− (v)),βi (ϕ+ (v))].
From Corollary 1 (i) below, all bids, and not only βi (v),i n[βi(ϕ− (v)),r −1 (v)]
are optimal for bidder i, that is, bidder i’s expected payoﬀ is constant in this
interval. The reason is simple: after winning the auction with his equilib-
rium bid b in the interior of this interval, the more aggressive bidder j with
value αj (b) demands r(b) as the resale price, which bidder i accepts since
r(b) <v . Consequently, the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a bid change by bidder i
around b on his expected payoﬀ does not depend on his value v, and hence
must vanish, since b is optimal for some value.
In Example 1 all bids in [c,r−1 (v2)] are optimal for bidder 2. In Example
2, all bids in [β1 (z),r −1 (v1)] are optimal for bidder 1 with value v1 >z .
In the SPA, from the FOC (11), r(b)=b and the interval of optimal bids
is [ϕ− (v),v]:b i d d e r i is indiﬀerent between winning and losing against an
opponent who submits a bid b in this interval because he ends up with the
item and pays the same price b in both cases.
FIGURES 1, 2
As stated in Corollary 1 (ii), the equilibrium resale price characterizes the
post-resale equilibrium allocation. If bidder 1’s value is v1, bidder 2 ends up
with the item if and only if his value is above the cut-oﬀ λ
s
ϕ (v1) below, which
is the resale price bidder 1 requires, when bidder 1 is more aggressive at v1,
and the value at which bidder 2 requires v1, when bidder 1 is less aggressive
at v1 (see Figures 1 and 2):
14βi (ϕ− (v)) <β i (v) follows from ϕ− (v) <vand βi (v) <r −1 (v) from
ρs
i (v,αj (βi (v))) <v , which in turns follows from βi (v) <β j (v).









¢−1 (v1),i fϕ(v1) ≤ v1.
Corollary 1: For any PBE as in Theorem 1:
(i) All bids in [βi(ϕ− (v)),r −1 (v)] are optimal for bidder i with value v
in [c,d] if he is less aggressive at v.
(ii) If the bidders’ values v1,v 2 are such that v2 <(>)λ
s
ϕ (v1), then the
item eventually goes to bidder 1 (2).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
3. The FD Regime
3.1 The Ratchet Eﬀect and Theorem 2
Bidders get no payoﬀ from resale in any symmetric separating PBE of
the SPA, since such a PBE is eﬃcient, and a standard argument shows that
the common bidding function can then not be diﬀerent from the identity
function. Haile (1999) already proved that the truth-bidding equilibrium
of the SPA without resale is also a PBE and hence the unique symmetric
separating PBE of the SPA with resale.
When resale occurs in a separating PBE, the auction winner demands
as a resale price the loser’s value, which he infers from the losing bid under
FD. Because of the implied ratchet eﬀect—the asymmetrical consequences of
upwards and downwards deviations—, there exists no separating PBE of the
SPA or FPA where bidders follow diﬀerent strictly increasing and diﬀeren-
tiable bidding functions. In fact, if small upwards deviations, which bring
him no payoﬀ at resale (he would refuse any resale oﬀer), were not prof-
itable to the (locally) less aggressive bidder, downwards deviations would be
strictly proﬁtable, since they would increase his payoﬀ at resale when the
auction allocation is ineﬃcient: a nonpositive right-hand derivative of the
12payoﬀ would imply a strictly negative left-hand derivative. In particular,
since the same bidding function could not satisfy both bidders’ (diﬀerent)
FOC’s, there exists no pure separating (symmetric or asymmetric) PBE of
the FPA with strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable bidding functions when
F1 6= F2.
Nevertheless, as we now show, there exist semi-separating behavioral
PBE’s where the less aggressive bidder does not completely reveal his value
through his bid. A behavioral bidding strategy of bidder i is a (regular16)
conditional probability measure Gi (.|.) with respect to vi in [c,d]. A resale
strategy is characterized by a (measurable) function δi (.;.).I f b i d d e r i with
value vi follows (Gi (.|.),δi), he chooses his bid according to Gi (.|vi) and, af-
ter winning the auction where bidder j bids bj,d e m a n d sδi (vi;bj) at resale.
Here, the second argument of the resale function δi of bidder i is not, as in
S e c t i o n2 ,h i so w nb i d ,b u tr a t h e rb i d d e rj’s bid, which he observes. We
again assume that the auction loser refuses the resale price if and only if it
is strictly larger than his value.
We specify the revised beliefs bidder i holds about bidder j’s value af-
ter he observes bidder j’s bid bj through a (regular) conditional probabil-
ity measure Fj (.|bj). We use the same notation for a probability measure
and its cumulative function and we call a couple of strategies and beliefs
(G1 (.|.),δ 1,F 2 (.|.);G2 (.|.),δ2,F 1 (.|.)) a PBE if it can be completed into
one. The randomization procedure, mentioned in Theorem 2 below, is an
e x p l i c i tp r o c e d u r eo fc o n s t r u c t i o no fP B E ’ su n d e rF Dt h a tw ep r e s e n ti nt h e
next subsection.
Theorem 2: Let E be a PBE of an auction under ND as in Theorem
1. Let E0 be the output of the randomization procedure applied to E.T h e n :
(i) E0 is a PBE of the same auction under FD.
16Following the standard terminology in probability theory, this means that Gi (.|vi) is
a probability measure, for all vi,a n dGi (b|.) is measurable, for all b.
13(ii) The bid marginal distributions, the interim total expected payoﬀs,
and the post-resale allocation are the same in E0 as in E;
(iii) Conditionally on the value of the auction winner, strictly prof-
itable resale takes place with the same probability in E0 as in E and, when
this probability is diﬀerent from zero, at the same price;
(iv) If the auction is the SPA, the auction outcomes—the bids and the
allocation before resale—are posterior implemented by E0 or, for short, E0 is
posterior implementable.
(v) There exists a PBE of the auction under ND17 with the same
bidding strategies and, along the equilibrium path, the same take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀers from the auction winner as in E0.
Following Green and Laﬀont (1987) (see, also, Lopomo 2001), (iv) means
that all bids in the support of bidder i’s bidding strategy conditional on vi
are optimal for bidder i with value vi even after he learns bidder j’s bid.
3.2 The Randomization Procedure
Let E =( β1,γ1;β2,γ2) be a PBE as in Theorem 1 and ϕ = α2β1.T h e
main idea of the randomization procedure is to have any bidder who bids less
aggressively in E mix over his set of optimal bids (Corollary 1 (i) describes)
in such a way that when the other bidder wins and observes the losing bid,
he chooses the same resale price as in E. This requirement determines
the auction winner’s beliefs conditional on the losing bid. The marginal bid
distribution is taken to be the same as in E. These conditional and marginal
distributions then determine a joint distribution, which, using Milgrom and
Weber (1985)’s terminology, is a “distributional strategy,” that is, such that
its marginal value distribution is the bidder’s actual value distribution.
17(v) actually holds true for any disclosure policy, including, for example, release of
“garbled” information about the bids. When E is asymmetric, the bidding strategies in
E and E0 diﬀer.
14Revised Beliefs:
C1 If αj (bj) ≤ αi (bj), Fj (.|bj) is concentrated at αj (bj).






αir−1 (w) − w
.
Bidding Strategies:
B1 If βi (vj) ≤ βj (vj), Gj (.|vj) is concentrated at βj (vj).
B2 If βj (vj) <β i (vj),t h es u p p o r to fGj (.|vj) is
£











fj (vj)(vj − αir−1 (vj))
.(13)
Resale Strategies:
RS1 If αj (bj) ≤ αi (bj),
δi (vi;bj)
=m a x ( r(βi (vi)),α j (bj)),i fβj (vi) ≤ βi (vi)
=m a x ( αj (bj),v i), otherwise.
RS2 If αj (bj) >α i (bj),
δi (vi;bj)
=m a x ( r(βi (vi)),r(bj)),i fβj (vi) ≤ βi (vi);
=m a x ( vi,r(bj)), otherwise.
F r o mL e m m a2( i )b e l o w ,C 1 - C 2i n d e e dd e ﬁne a conditional distribution.
We now illustrate with Example 1 the proof of Lemma 2 (ii), according to
which, if we choose Fjαj as bidder j’s marginal bid distribution, the implied
joint distribution of values and bids has Fj at its value marginal distribution.
15From C2, the support of F2 (.|b2) is [r(b2),d],f o ra l lb2 in (c,β2 (d)),a n d ,








for all w in [r(b2),d]. Integrating this equation with respect to b2 according
to the marginal F2α2 (b2) from c to r−1 (w),w eﬁnd that the joint distribution
of values and bids has a marginal value distribution F∗




































2 (w) − F2 (w)) =
F2 (w) − F∗
2 (w)
w − α1r−1 (w)
.
Consequently, if F∗
2 (w) − F2 (w) was strictly positive at w,i tw o u l db e
strictly decreasing and strictly positive over [c,w], which is impossible since
F∗
2 (c)=F2 (c)=0 . A strictly negative diﬀerence F∗
2 (w) − F2 (w) is sim-
ilarly impossible. The marginal distribution F∗
2 is then equal to the actual
distribution F2 everywhere.
In Example 2, one can easily check that B1-B2 give the conditionals of
the distributional strategies, that is, that Lemma 2 (iii) below hold true.
For example, bidder 2’s conditional must make him bid β2 (v2) if v2 ≥ z and
randomize over [c,r−1 (v2)] if v2 <z . For this latter case, diﬀerentiating,
with respect to v2, F2 (v2|b2) from C2, integrating it over [b,r−1 (v2)] with
16respect to b2, distributed according to F2α2, and dividing it by f2 (v2) give
the expression in B218.
Lemma 2:
(i) Fj (.|bj) in C1-C2 is a (regular) conditional distribution . The distrib-






αir−1(w)−w in the interior of the support. Furthermore,
Fj (vj|bj) is continuous with respect to bj,f o ra l lvj in (r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))).
(ii) There exists one and only one distributional strategy of bidder j with
marginal Fjαj (bj) and a conditional that satisﬁes C1-C2.
(iii) Gj (bj|vj) in B1-B2 is a (regular) conditional distribution of bidder
j’s distributional strategy in (ii).
(iv) δi (.;.) in RS1-RS2 is optimal for bidder i with revised beliefs Fj (.|.,.).
(v) For all bj not larger than the maximum of the support of Gi (.|vi),
we have:
δi (vi;bj)
= r(βi (vi)),i fβj (vi) ≤ βi (vi);
= vi, otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
From Lemma 2 (iv) above, the resale prices in RS1-RS2 are optimal for
the auction winner, given his revised beliefs. From Lemma 2 (v), if a bidder
has won the auction by following his bidding strategy in B1-B2, the price he
demands at resale does not depend on the loser’s bid. We check Lemma 2
18In the example with diﬀerent value upper extremities where v1,v 2 are uniformly dis-
tributed over [0,1] and [0,d], d>1, the equilibrium bidding strategies under ND are
such that β1 (v)=β2 (dv)=( 1 + d)v/4. In an equivalent PBE under FD, bidder
2 bids according to G2 (b|v2)=( 2 b/v2)
2d/(d−1) (over [0,v 2/2])i fv2 ≤ (1 + d)/2 and
G2 (b|v2)=( 4 b/(1 + d))
2d/(d−1) (over [0,(1 + d)/4])i fv2 ≥ (1 + d)/2.H e r e , t h e r a n -
domization procedure does not uniquely determine G2 (b|v2) for v2 > (1 + d)/2.
17(iv, v) for bidder 2 in Example 2. RS1-RS2 for bidder 2 with value v2 >z
reduce to:
δ2 (v2;b1)=r(b1),i fb1 ≥ β2 (v2);
= r(β2 (v2)),f o ra l lb1 ≤ β2 (v2).





α2r−1(w)−w have support [r(b1),d] and virtual value:
v1 −




which is larger than v2 if and only if v1 is larger than r(β2 (v2)),a n dr(β2 (v2))
is bidder 2’s unique optimal resale price. If bidder 2 observes b1 in [c,β1 (z)],
no proﬁtable resale is possible and r(β2 (v2)) is one of bidder 2’s optimal
resale prices.
If, after deviating from his equilibrium bid, bidder 2 wins and observes
b1 in (β2 (v2),β1 (d)), r(b1) is his unique optimal resale price because it is
t h em i n i m u mo ft h es u p p o r to fF1 (.|b1) and is optimal for bidder 2’s larger
value α2 (b1). If bidder 2 observes a bid b1 >β 1 (d), r(d)=d is optimal for
bidder 2’s revised beliefs, which are concentrated at d.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Bidder i’s net-value function us
i—the diﬀerence between his utility u
s,w
i
18from winning and his utility u
s,l
i from losing—is as follows19:
u
s
i (vi,v j;bi,b j)
= δi (vi;bj),i fn o tl a r g e rt h a nvj;
= δj (vj;bi), if not larger than vi;
= vi, otherwise.
Here, contrary to Section 2, bidder i’s utility in case of winning u
s,w
i de-
pends on bidder j’s bid bj, which bidder i observes after winning, and is
independent of bidder i’s own bid bi. Thus we may consider bidder i’s win-





i (vi,v j;bi,b j)dFj (vj|bj)dFjαj (bj), where, according to the random-
ization procedure, bidder j’s marginal bid probability distribution in E0 is
the same—Fjαj—as in E.
Lemma 3 below is similar to Lemma 1 and follows from the randomization
procedure. Lemma 3 (i.1) and (i.2) come from the independence, by Lemma
2 (v), of the resale price on the auction loser’s bid, if the auction winner
follows his bidding strategy in E0. Lemma 3 (ii) holds true because, although
the bidders use behavioral bidding strategies, resale remedies any ineﬃcient
outcome after a tie. For example, when bidder 2 with value v2 in (z,d) in
Example 2 wins after tying at β2 (v2), he demands the resale price r(β2 (v2)),
which bidder 1 accepts with probability one because it is the minimum of
the support of F1 (.|b1 = β2 (v2)). The monotonicity in Lemma 3 (iii) follows
from the monotonicity of a bidder’s optimal expected payoﬀ at resale with
respect to his value.
Lemma 3:
19Since we only consider βi,βj from a given E, we drop them from the argument of the
net values us
i.








i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj)












i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj)dFjαj (bj).




i (αi (b),v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b)=r(b).
(iii) For all b ≥ c,
R
us
i (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b) is nondecreasing with
respect to vi in [c,d] and continuous with respect to b.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The proof in Appendix 2 of Theorem 2 (i) is similar to the proof, in
Section 2, of Theorem 1. Consider bidder 1 in Example 1 with value v1 in
(c,d). His expected payoﬀ in the FPA is quasi-concave with respect to his
bid with a maximum at b = β1 (v1). I nf a c t ,i t sd e r i v a t i v ei sn o n n e g a t i v e
below β1 (v1) and nonpositive above it. For example, the derivative at b in
(c,r−1 (v1)) is, up to the factor F2α2 (b):
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
R v1
r(b) v2dF2 (v2|b)
+v2 (F2 (r(β1 (v1))|b) − F2 (v1|b))
+r(β1 (v1))(1 − F2 (r(β1 (v1))|b))
−b
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬





The ﬁrst three terms in the factor between braces above is the net expected
20utility at b:t h e ﬁrst term is the expected resale price bidder 1 saves by
winning at auction rather than buying at resale (bidder 2 demands his value
as the resale price), the second and third terms are the expected payoﬀ
bidder 1 receives from reselling the item (bidder 1 demands r(β1 (v1)) after
winning the auction). Since this net expected utility is nondecreasing in
v1 (see the general proof in Appendix 2), it is not smaller than r(b),w h a t
it would be at α1 (b) <v 1. The derivative above is then not smaller than
(r(b) − b) d
db lnF2α2 (b) − 1, which is equal to zero.
Contrary to Lemma 1 (i), the similar property for the ND regime, Lemma




i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj) is equal to the actual net utility bidder i
receives from submitting bi ≤ bj when his opponent submits bj.T h e q u a s i -
concavity (which follows from Lemma 3) of bidder i’s expected payoﬀ20 in
the SPA implies the no-regret property: bidder i wins against all those bids
bj that contribute nonnegatively to his payoﬀ and loses against those that
would contribute nonpositively.
Proof of Theorem 2:S e e A p p e n d i x 2 .
Although the ﬁnal allocations in E0 and E are identical, the intermediate
allocations, after the auction and before resale, diﬀer with strictly positive
probability if the equilibria are asymmetric. For example, in Figure 1, if






,b i d d e r1
wins the auction in E with probability one and loses it with strictly positive
probability in E0.
3.4 Multiplicity of PBE’s of the SPA
Beyond the multiplicity in Theorem 2, we construct in Appendix 3 further
PBE’s of the SPA by extending Theorem 1 and the randomization procedure
to nondecreasing, and possibly discontinuous, functions ϕ. For example, in
20Which is, up to a term constant in bi,
R bi ¡R
us
i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj) − bj
¢
dFjαj (bj).
21the PBE constructed from the function ϕ such that ϕ(v1)=θ
∗,f o ra l lv1
in [c,θ
∗],a n dϕ(v1)=v1, for all v1 in [θ
∗,d]: the bidding functions are such
that β1 (v1)=ρs (v1,θ
∗), for all v1 in [c,θ
∗],a n dβ1 (v1)=v1, for all v1 in
[θ
∗,d]; β2 (v2)=ρs (c,v2),f o ra l lv2 in [c,θ
∗), β2 (θ
∗) belongs to [ρs (c,θ
∗),θ
∗],
and β2 (v2)=v2,f o ra l lv1 in (θ
∗,d]. While our randomization procedure
produces an equivalent behavioral PBE where bidder 2 with value v2 in [c,θ
∗)
randomizes over [c,v2],w ec a nm a k eh i mb i d 21 c instead and obtain Garratt et
al (2006b)’s pure PBE under FD and no discounting22.I f θ
∗ = d,w eo b t a i n
the “extreme” PBE where a bidding function takes the constant value d and
the other takes the constant value c23. From Garratt et al (2008), some
lotteries over such PBE’s, for example, the lottery that gives probability
1/2 to each extreme PBE when the values are identically and uniformly
distributed, dominate the truth-bidding PBE with respect to the bidders’
interim payoﬀs24.
Hafalir and Krishna (2008) prove that the truth-bidding PBE is the only
PBE where no bidder would regret his resale oﬀer, nor his bid, upon learning
the other bidder’s value. Of course, the values being private, a bidder may
actually never learn the other bidder’s value. From Theorem 2 (iv), all our
PBE’s satisfy the weaker no-regret property according to which no bidder
will regret his bid after he learns the other bidder’s bid, which he does if he
wins the auction. Moreover, any of our PBE’s remains a PBE after a change
21Since c is among his optimal bids, bidder 2 has no incentive to deviate. Bidder 1 has no
incentive to deviate from his bidding strategy because by submitting a bid in (c,ρs (c,θ
∗)),
where bidder 2’s bid distribution has changed, he now obtains the same expected payoﬀ
he previously obtained by submitting a bid in (ρs (c,θ
∗),θ
∗).D e v i a t i n g t o c is also
unproﬁtable, since bidding slightly above it is at least as advantageous (depending on the
tie-breaking rule).
22A similar construction when the auction loser sets the resale price (see Section 4) gives
the bidding functions β1 (v1)=v1, for all v1 in [c,θ
∗); β1 (v1)=d, for all v1 in (θ
∗,d];
β2 (v2)=v2, for all v2 in [c,θ
∗); β2 (v2)=ρb (θ
∗,v 2), for all v2 in (θ
∗,d].
23This is a PBE for any (voluntary) bargaining at resale.
24Bidders might then want to implement such a combination of PBE’s, if they have
access to a common randomizing device.
22of the value distribution of the more aggressive bidder25.
As in the common-value model (Bikchandani 1988, Klemperer 1998, Bu-
low et al 1999), the multiplicity of PBE’s of the SPA reﬂects the sensitivity
of the outcome to small changes in the rules or payoﬀs. For example, as
in k-price auctions, inject an element of FPA by having bidder i,i fh ew i n s ,
pay the weighted average kibi +( 1− ki)bj of his bid and the second highest
bid, where ki is small. We show in Section 6 that the then only diﬀeren-
tiable PBE under ND is payoﬀ equivalent to the PBE of the unaltered SPA
that is constructed from ϕ = F
−1
2 Fl
1,w h e r el = k1/k2. Furthermore, this
particular PBE of the SPA is the limit of the PBE of the hybrid auction, as
k1 and k2 tend towards zero while the ratio k1/k2 stays constant at l26.T h e
randomization procedure would also produce PBE’s of the hybrid auctions
under FD.
See Section 7 for selection criteria from the literature on auctions with
common value.
3 . 5N oO t h e rP B E ’ sW i t h i naR e s t r i c t e dC l a s s
We now show that the randomization procedure produces all the PBE’s
under FD that satisfy the following assumptions, for all i,j, i 6= j:











A2 When mutually strictly proﬁtable resale is possible according to Fj (.|b),
δi (v,b) is bidder i’s unique optimal resale price.
A3 The support of bidder i’s distributional strategy is the closed set









25See Corollary A3.1 in Appendix 3.
26Similar small perturbations in the rules might be used by an auctioneer who would























2 are diﬀerentiable over (c,d] with strictly positive derivatives.
A7 For all open subinterval (v0,v 00) of [c,d] such that β
u
i (v) ≥ β
u
j (v),f o r
all v in (v0,v 00):





















j everywhere over the same interval;
A7.2 β
l
l is diﬀerentiable over (v0,v00);





A7.3 δi (v;b) is continuous with respect to b at (vi,b) if b ≤ β
u
i (vi);
A7.4 δi (v;b) is continuous with respect to v and diﬀerentiable with
respect to b at (vi,b) if b ≤ β
u
i (vi) and (vi,b) belongs to the interior of the
support of bidder j’s distributional strategy.
Because of the rachet eﬀect, there can only exist PBE’s where the less
aggressive bidder follows a behavioral strategy. Moreover if a bidder follows
a pure bidding strategy, the graph of his bidding function cannot intersect
the interior of his opponent’s distributional strategy. If it was the case, he
would be a buyer at resale with a strictly positive probability and the ratchet
eﬀect would make impossible to prevent deviations. Hence, we assume, in
A7.1, that, when the bidders do not use the same bidding function, the less
aggressive bidder randomizes over a range of bids and the more aggressive
bidder follows a bidding function above this range27.
A3, A5, and A7.0 are assumptions of “full support.” A4 is a monotonic-
ity assumption. The uniqueness of the optimal resale price, when proﬁtable
resale is possible, also implies its monotonicity with respect to the price set-
ter’s value. A1, A5, A6, and A7.2 to A7.4 are continuity and diﬀerentiability
assumptions. We have the remark and Theorem 3 below.




i (v). The second part of A7.1 would
then have followed from the ratchet eﬀect.
24Remark: A3, A4, A5, and A7.1 imply that β
l






Theorem 3: Let E0 be a PBE of an auction under FD that satisﬁes
Assumptions A1 to A7. Then, there exists a PBE E as in Theorem 1 of
the auction under ND such that E and the PBE under FD produced by the
randomization procedure applied to E are equivalent, in the sense of (i) and
(ii) in Theorem 2, to E0.
The main tools of our proof are the ratchet eﬀect and the following “prob-
ability invariance,” which is a direct consequence of the envelope theorem. It
states that, in the interior of the support of bidder i’s distributional strategy,
the probability Pri (w,b) that he becomes the eventual owner of the item is
independent of his bid b.
Proposition: (Probability Invariance) If (w,w0) × (b,b0) is included in
the interior of the support of bidder i’s distributional strategy in a PBE, then




, for all b00,e b in (b,b0) and almost-all w00 in (w,w0).
Proof:28 From the assumptions above, within the interior of the support
of his distributional strategy, the less aggressive bidder’s expected payoﬀ is
a continuous function of his bid29. From A7.0, all bids in (b,b0) must give
t h es a m eo p t i m a lp a y o ﬀ Pi (w00) to bidder i with value w00 in (w,w0).
Let vi,v 0
i be in (w,w0). Since, for all (w00,b 00) in (w,w0) × (b,b0),b i d d e r














28In the proof, we only make use of the continuity of a bidder’s expected payoﬀ with
respect to his bid.
29The expected payoﬀ from the auction stage is obviously
continuous. The expected payoﬀ from the resale stage RR
I (bj >b ;v0 <v j <v 00)max(vi − δj (vj;b),0)dFj (vj|bj)dGj (bj) is also continu-
ous since the function inside the integral is continuous at b, for all vj (from A7.3) and


















for all b00,e b in (b,b0) and vi,v0





for almost-all w00 in (w,w0). ||
We sketch below the remaining main steps of the proof, whose details can
be found in Appendix 4.
Step 1: After winning a tie at auction, the more aggressive bidder de-
mands a resale price that is accepted with probability one. (Lemma A4.1)
Sketch of the proof: Otherwise, there would be values for which
the less aggressive bidder randomizes that are smaller than the resale price.
Since he would refuse resale oﬀers, this bidder could then obtain the item
only by winning the auction, the probability of which is not constant (since
it decreases with his bid), and it would contradict probability invariance (See
Figure A1).
Step 2: If the couple formed by the resale price of the more aggressive
bidder and the less aggressive bidder’s bid belongs to the interior of the support
of this latter bidder’s distributional strategy, the resale price is independent
of the bid (Lemma A4.2).
Sketch of the proof: Otherwise, the graph of the resale price, as
function of the less aggressive bidder’s bid, would not be vertical and some
changes of bids, within the support of the distributional strategy, would cross
these graphs and result in diﬀerent probabilities of the less aggressive bidder’s
getting the item (see Figure A2).
From Steps 1 and 2, as the bid from the less aggressive bidder decreases
starting from a tie, the graph of the resale price starts from the upper bound-
ary of the support of his distributional strategy, may follow this upper bound-
26ary, is vertical after it enters the interior of the support, and may then follow
the lower boundary (Lemma A4.3).
Step 3: For a ﬁxed value of the more aggressive bidder, the graph of the
resale price he demands does not follow the upper boundary of the support of
the less aggressive bidder’s strategy (Lemma A4.4).
Sketch of the proof: Otherwise, a “modiﬁed” ratchet eﬀect would
exist: although deviations from the same bid starting from couples in the
interior and on the upper boundary of the bid support would have the same
eﬀect—proportional to the diﬀerence between the resale price (which the less
aggressive bidder accepts, from Step 1) and the bid—through the change of
auction outcome, a deviation from the interior has an eﬀect through the
resale price when the less aggressive bidder keeps losing, while an upward
deviation from the upper boundary does not (since the less aggressive bidder
refuses any resale price) (See Figure A3).
Step 4: The lower boundary of the less aggressive bidder’s support is
ﬂat (Lemma A4.5).
Sketch of the proof: Otherwise, a ratchet eﬀect would exist: a
downward bid deviation from a point on the lower boundary would change
the less aggressive bidder’s payoﬀ from resale, while an upward deviation
would not (See Figure A4).
From Steps 3 and 4, if bidder i is more aggressive at vi, the resale price
bidder i d e m a n d si se q u a lt oαu
jβ
u
i (vi),w h e r eαu
j is the inverse of β
u
j,a n di s
independent of his opponent’s bid when proﬁtable resale is possible. Since
αu
j (βi (vi)) ≥ vi,w et h e nh a v e :
α
u
j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
p (p − vi)(1− Fj (p|b)),
for all b ≤ βi (vi). Integrating the objective function over this range of bids
27with respect to bidder j’s marginal bid distribution Gj,w eﬁnd:
α
u
j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
p (p − vi)(Gj (βi (vi)) − Fj (p)).( 1 4 )
The ﬁnal step of the proof is Step 5 below.
Step 5: (“Inverse randomization procedure”) The PBE is equivalent to











i (vi)=βi (vi),i fb i d d e ri is more aggressive at vi), where Gi is bidder i’s
marginal bid distribution (Lemmas A4.6 and A4.7).













. Because resale always occurs after




2 then satisfy the same
F O C ’ sa st h eP B E ’ su n d e rN D .
From Theorem 2 and Subsection 3.4, there exist PBE’s of the SPA that are
not diﬀerentiable or even exhibit discontinuities, and nonconvex bid supports,
and hence that do not belong to the restricted class of this subsection. We
do not address the existence of PBE’s of the FPA outside this class.
3.6 Revenue Comparisons Across Auctions
Since none of our PBE’s gives a positive payoﬀ to any bidder with the
smallest value c, the auctioneer’s expected revenues are, from Myerson (1981),
the expectation of the eventual owner’s virtual value. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that bidder 1 has the higher virtual value when both bidders’
values are c or, equivalently, f1 (c) ≥ f2 (c).L e t ψ be the function that links
the bidders’ values with the same virtual value, that is, such that:
ψ(v) −
1 − F2 (ψ(v))
f2 (ψ(v))
= v −
1 − F1 (v)
f1 (v)
,( 1 5 )
for all v in [c,d]. From Corollary 1 (ii), a PBE’s ﬁnal allocation is charac-
terized by the function λ
s
ϕ,w i t hϕ = α2β1.I f λ
s
ϕ was equal to ψ,t h eP B E
28would maximize revenues. Under the assumption of diﬀerentiability of ψ,
it is simple to prove (Lemma A6.1 in Appendix 6) that, when the bidders
are heterogeneous, this is not the case for the FPA, where, from Theorem
1, ϕ = F
−1
2 F1. Thus, there exists an interval where λ
s
ϕ,w i t hϕ = F
−1
2 F1,i s
everywhere diﬀerent from ψ. By slightly moving ϕ over this interval, while
keeping it continuous and strictly increasing, towards and away from ψ,o n e
makes λ
s
ϕ move in the same direction and Corollary 2 follows.
Corollary 2: When ψ is diﬀerentiable and F1 6= F2,t h er e v e n u e sf r o m
the PBE of the FPA are strictly smaller than the revenues from some PBE’s
of the SPA and strictly larger than the revenues from some others30.
With homogeneous bidders, the PBE of the FPA and the truth-bidding
PBE of the SPA are eﬃcient and maximize revenues.
4. The Other Bargaining Procedure at Resale





increasing, we can apply the methods above to auctions after which the
auction loser sets the resale price by using, instead of ρs, the buyer’s optimal-
resale-price function31 ρb,w h o s ev a l u ea t(w1,w 2), is the unique solution to
the equation below:
wl = ρ
b (w1,w 2) −
Fk(wk) − Fk(ρb (w1,w 2))
fk(ρb (w1,w 2))
,
with k and l such that {k,l} = {1,2} and wk ≤ wl. Results similar to all
the results above (including Corollary 2) hold true. The ﬁnal equilibrium
30Obviously, an extreme PBE of the SPA as in Subsection 3.4 gives lower revenues—c—
than the PBE of the FPA.
31(2) becomes γi (v;b)=ρb
i (v,min(v,αj (b))).
29allocation is characterized by λ
b











¢−1 (v1),i fϕ(v1) ≥ v1.
The randomization procedure makes the more aggressive bidder, who is here
the equilibrium resale-price taker, randomize over his set of optimal bids— h¡
rb¢−1 (v),βi(ϕ+ (v))
i
,w h e r erb = ρb (α1,α 2), if his value is v.I n t h e
deﬁnition of the restricted class in Subsection 3.5, within which we charac-





2 are diﬀerentiable over (c,d] with strictly positive derivatives.
A7b For all open subinterval (v0,v00) of [c,d] such that β
l
i (v) ≥ β
l
j (v),f o r
all v in (v0,v 00):





















i everywhere over the same interval;
A7.2 β
u
i is diﬀerentiable over (v0,v00);









A7.3 δj is continuous with respect to b at (vj,b) if b ≥ β
l
j (vj);
A7.4 δj is continuous with respect to v and diﬀerentiable with respect
to b at (vj,b) if b ≥ β
l
j (vi) and (vj,b) belongs to the interior of the support
of bidder i’s distributional strategy.
5. Revenue Comparisons Across Bargaining Procedures
In this section, we assume that f1 (c) ≥ f2 (c) a n dt h a tb o t hs e l l e r -
virtual-value-functions and buyer-virtual-value-functions are strictly increas-
ing. When the bidders are homogeneous, the PBE of the FPA under both
bargaining procedures reduces to the equilibrium of the FPA with no resale
allowed, and we have Corollary 3 (i) below. Although, as simple examples
30show (see Appendix 5), the equilibrium bid distributions do not generally
dominate those when the auction loser sets the resale price, we prove below
that the expected revenues are strictly higher when the auction winner sets
the resale price following the FPA and the bidders are heterogenous32.
Corollary 3:
(i) When F1 = F2, the revenues from the FPA are the same whether the
auction winner or the auction loser sets the resale price.
(ii) When F1 6= F2, the revenues from the PBE of the FPA are strictly
higher when the auction winner sets the resale price.










the auction loser sets it. According to Lemma 4 below, wherever the ﬁnal
allocations diﬀer, the PBE under the former bargaining procedure chooses
the bidder with higher (buyer-) virtual value as the eventual owner of the





2 F1 6= ψ, it also implies that the allocations do diﬀer. (ii) then
follows from Myerson (1981). ||












2 F1 (v) < ( > )λ
s
F−1
2 F1 (v) if and only if λ
s
F−1
2 F1 (v) < ( > )ψ(v).
Proof: See Appendix 6.
32In the uniform example of Footnote 18, we have, under ND: β1 (v)=β2 (dv)=
(1 + d)v/4,i fv ≤ 2/(1 + d); 1 − 1/(v(1 + d)),i fv ≥ 2/(1 + d) (in the formula







is the corner solution 1
when q>2/(1 + d)). The randomization procedure makes bidder 1 bid, under FD,
over [v/2,d/(d +1 ) ] according to: G1 (b|v1)=1 − (v/2b)
2/(d−1),i fv/2 ≤ b ≤ 1/2;
1 − v2/(d−1) {d +1− 1/(1 − b)}/(d − 1),i f1/2 ≤ b ≤ d/(d +1 ) .
31We now present assumptions under which the equilibrium revenues from
the SPA have the same range under both bargaining procedures. Assume
the auction winner sets the resale price. If there exists a nondecreasing
function ϕ∗ such that λ
s
ϕ∗ = ψ, then the PBE of the SPA constructed from a
strictly increasing and continuous function ϕ,w i t hϕ(c)=c and ϕ(d)=d,
that is close to ϕ∗ gives revenues close to the optimal revenues since its ﬁnal
allocation λ
s
ϕ is close to ψ. Assumption As below, which extends Zheng
(2002)’s “Resale Monotonicity Assumption” to unranked hazard rates in the
two-bidder case, is adapted from Lebrun (2008) and guarantees the existence
of such a function ϕ∗. According to Assumption As, when the optimal
allocation is biased in favor of bidder 1, for example, for some value v,t h e r e
exists an intermediate allocation that is further biased in favor of this bidder
and is deﬁned by a nondecreasing function such that, after receiving the item
at the intermediate stage, he oﬀers ψ(v) as the resale-price.
Assumption As:
(i) The unique continuous function µs
2 deﬁned over C = {v ∈ [c,d]|ψ(v) ≥ v}
a n ds u c ht h a tµs
2 (v) ≥ ψ(v) and ρs (v,µs
2 (v)) = ψ(v),f o ra l lv in C,i sn o n -
decreasing.
( i i ) T h eu n i q u ec o n t i n u o u sf u n c t i o nµs
1 deﬁned over D = {v ∈ [c,d]|ψ(v) ≤ v}
and such that µs
1 (v) ≥ ψ
−1 (v) and ρs (µs
1 (v),v)=ψ
−1 (v), for all v in D,i s
nondecreasing.
The existence of the functions µs
1,µ s
2 as deﬁned above comes from the
continuity and strict monotonicity of ρs. The function ϕ∗ can be constructed
as follows: ϕ∗ = µs
2 over C and ϕ∗ =( µs
1)
−1 over µ1 (D). Corollary 4 below
follows.
Corollary 4: Let the auction winner set the resale price and let As-
sumption As be satisﬁed. Then, for any incentive-compatible and individu-
ally rational mechanism that sells the item with probability one, there exist
PBE’s of the SPA that give either higher or arbitrarily close revenues.
32Assumption Ab, again adapted from Lebrun (2008), and Corollary 5 below
are relevant to the other bargaining procedure at resale33.
Assumption Ab: Let f1 (c) and f2 (c) be equal.
(i) The unique continuous function µb
1 deﬁned over C a n ds u c ht h a t
µb
1 (v) ≤ ψ





−1 (v),f o ra l lv in C, is nondecreasing.
( i i ) T h eu n i q u ec o n t i n u o u sf u n c t i o nµb
2 deﬁned over D a n ds u c ht h a t
µb




= ψ(v), for all v in D, is nondecreasing.
Corollary 5: Let the auction loser set the resale price and let Assump-
tion Ab be satisﬁed. Then, for any incentive-compatible and individually ra-
tional mechanism that sells the item with probability one, there exist PBE’s
of the SPA that give either higher or arbitrarily close revenues.
6. (k1,k 2)-Price Auctions.
For k in (0,1), Güth and van Damme (1986) deﬁne the k-price auction,
or k-PA, as the auction where the highest bidder wins and pays the weighted
average of his bid and the second highest bid with respective weights k and
1−k.I f k =0 ,t h ek-PA is the SPA and if k =1it is the FPA. We further
extend the deﬁnition to allow discriminatory auction rules. In a (k1,k 2)-price
auction, or (k1,k 2)-PA, the auction price is computed with the weights k1 and
1 − k1 when bidder 1 wins and k2 and 1 − k2 when bidder 2 wins.
The analysis of the FPA easily extends to such (k1,k 2)-PA’s, where k1,k 2
belong to (0,1]. For example, under FD, the FOC becomes, where x = s
33If f1 (c) >f 2 (c),t h e nψ(c) >cand there exists no ϕ∗ such that λ
b
ϕ∗ = ψ.I n f a c t ,
if there existed such a function ϕ∗, one would have c ≤ (ϕ∗)
−1 (v)=µb
1 (v) ≤ ψ
−1 (v),f o r
all v in E = {v ∈ [ψ (c),d]|ψ(v) ≥ v},a n dt h u sϕ∗ (c)=ψ (c) >c . Consequently, bidder
2w i t hv a l u eψ (c) >cwould choose, as a buyer at resale, the price c when he believes
that bidder 1’s value is distributed over [c,d]. Since this resale price would never be
accepted, it would clearly not be optimal. In Assumption Ab,w er u l eo u tt h ei n e q u a l i t y
f1 (c) >f 2 (c) by assuming rather f1 (c)=f2 (c).N o t e t h a t ϕ∗ should then be deﬁned as ¡
µb
1
¢−1 over C and µb
2 over D.







ρx (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) − b































1/kj , i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.(18)
A theorem similar to Theorem 1 can be proved along the same lines. Our
randomization procedure produces a PBE under FD that is equivalent to the
PBE under ND.
From (17), the function ϕ that determines the post-auction allocation and
hence the function λ
x
ϕ that determines the ﬁnal allocation depend only on
the ratio k1/k2.C o n s e q u e n t l y , a l l k-PA’s, where k1 = k2 = k,g i v et h es a m e
payoﬀs as the FPA. As another particular consequence, for all ς in (0,1),
the (k1,k 2)-PA and the (ςk1,ςk 2)-PA give the same payoﬀs to the bidders
and the auctioneer as the SPA where the bidders follow the PBE that is




1 . In Appendix 7, we prove
that, if ζ tends towards zero, the PBE of the (ςk1,ςk 2)-PA tends towards
this payoﬀ-equivalent PBE of the SPA.
7. N-Bidder Extensions
We extend the model to n bidders with values independently distributed
over [c,d] according to distributions F1,...,Fn that satisfy the same assump-
34With the boundary condition β1 (d)=β2 (d).
34tions we made in the two-bidder model. In order to avoid the problem
of competing principals, we only consider the bargaining procedure where
the auction winner selects some bidders to take part in his “Myerson mecha-
nism,” that is, his optimal resale mechanism among all “transparent” (whose
rules can be applied independently of his private information) mechanisms
that forbid resale35.
7.1 EA
Consider the standard English auction, or EA, with irrevocable exit and
full information about the bidder’s activities, identities, and drop out prices36,
w h e r et h ep r i c es t a r t sr i s i n gf r o mc. Assume that even the inactive bidders
observe the entire public history of the auction.
I f ,a si ti sc u s t o m a r y ,w ei n t e r p r e tab i d d e r ’ sb i da st h ep r i c ea tw h i c h
he exits the auction if the other bidder has not yet, all our PBE’s of the
SPA under FD with n =2bidders are also PBE’s of the EA. It is then
straightforward to construct a multiplicity of PBE’s with n>2 bidders by
having all bidders follow the standard strategy—to drop out when the price
reaches one’s value—until all biders but two have dropped out. At this ﬁnal
stage, when the price rises from the last drop out price w, the two remaining
bidders follow (if they have not previously deviated) one of our PBE’s when
the values are distributed over the truncated interval [w,d]37. The function
ϕw used to construct this PBE may depend on the drop out price w and also
on the entire previous public history.
The revised beliefs about the value of a bidder who dropped out before
the ﬁnal stage are concentrated at his drop out price. From the random-
ization procedure, the virtual value of either of the two remaining bidders
conditional on his bid is at least equal to w and hence to the virtual value of
35In footnotes, we show that the auction winner, if able to commit, can implement this
mechanism even when further resale (among the auction losers) is allowed.
36Version (1) in Bikhchandani and Riley (1991).
37The (seller) virtual values remain strictly increasing after such a truncation.
35any bidder who dropped out earlier. Consequently, the auction winner, even
if he has previously deviated from his strategy, wants to include in his resale
mechanism only his opponent in the ﬁnal stage. In particular, it is optimal
for any two remaining bidders who have not previously deviated to follow
the 2-bidder PBE38.I nt h i sﬁnal stage PBE, the equilibrium and hence the
optimal payoﬀ of any bidder with value w is zero.
For a bidder’s deviation in a stage prior to the last stage to have an eﬀect
on his payoﬀ,i tm u s te i t h e r :
(i) make him active at the ﬁnal stage while he is supposed to drop out
earlier;
or
(ii) make him drop out while he is supposed to be active in the last stage.
In (i) his actual value is not larger than the level w of the price at the
start of the ﬁnal stage, following his deviation. The most he can obtain in
this ﬁnal stage can then not exceed his optimal payoﬀ if his value was equal
to this larger level. Since this optimal payoﬀ is zero39, no such deviation is
proﬁtable. In (ii), the deviation, since it brings him no payoﬀ, cannot be
proﬁtable. Consequently, such strategies and beliefs form a PBE.
7.2 FPA
Consider the subclass of models where:
(i) F1 = ... = Fn−1 = F;
(ii) Fn = H with density h that is continuously diﬀerentiable over (c,d]
and such that h




38Since the bidders who have previously dropped out have smaller values than the two
remaining bidders’, the winner’s resale mechanism is robust to the existence of further
resale stages.
39He can obtain this optimal payoﬀ by immediately dropping out.




F (d) > 0.
(iii) is the assumption of reverse-hazard-rate stochastic dominance of H
—the distribution of bidder n’s value—over F—the common distribution of bid-
ders 1 to n−1’s values (from (i)): bidders 1 to n−1 are homogeneous “weak”
bidders, while bidder n is “strong.” From (ii), the reverse hazard rate of H is
nondecreasing, that is, H is logconvex. (iv) rules out the simple symmetric
case where F = H (and where the PBE is equivalent to the equilibrium with
no resale allowed).
Here, a PBE under the FD regime is obtained by applying the randomiza-
tion procedure to the PBE under a “partial disclosure,” or PD, regime, where
only the bids from bidders 1 to n − 1 are publicly disclosed. We look for a
p u r eP B Ew h e r eb i d d e r s1t on − 1 follow the same bidding function β and
bidder n +1follows a bidding function δ such that β ≥ δ; β (c)=δ(c)=c;
β (d)=δ(d); and the derivatives β
0 and δ
0 exist and are strictly positive over
(c,d].L e t α and γ be the inverses of β and δ.W e d e n o t e ρ(v,w),w i t h
v ≤ w, the optimal resale price ρs (v,w) deﬁned as in (1) with F1 = F and
F2 = H and we denote r the function ρ(α,γ).
Assume bidder 1, for example, with value v1 wins with the bid b1 such
that γ (b1) >v 1 and observes that bidder j with bid bj is the highest bidder
among bidders 2,...,n − 1.I f α(bj) ≤ v1,h eo ﬀers to resell to bidder n at
the price ρ(v1,γ(b1))40. Otherwise, he implements his Myerson mechanism
by making sequential make-it-or-leave-it oﬀers: ﬁrst to bidder n at the price
ρ(α(bj),γ(b1)),a n d ,i fb i d d e rn refuses, next to bidder j at the price α(bj)41.
If proﬁtable resale is possible, bidder n upon winning resells to the bidder
who has submitted the second highest bid b at the price α(b).
As we show in Appendix 8, the FOC’s can be written as the following
40This mechnaism is robust to further resale.
41If further resale is allowed, bidder 1 resells at the price α(bj)H (ρ(α(bj),γ(b1))) +
ρ(α(bj),γ(b1))(H (γ (b1)) − H (ρ(α(bj),γ(b1)))) to bidder j, who will then oﬀer to resell
to bidder n at the price ρ(α(bj),γ(b1)).











(α(b) − b)H (r(b)) + (r(b) − b)(H (γ (b)) − H (r(b)))







(n − 1)(r(b) − b)
.(20)
Moreover, these FOC’s, along with the boundary conditions β (c)=δ(c)=
c,β (d)=δ(d), the strict monotonicity of β,δ, and the inequality β ≥ δ are
suﬃcient for an equilibrium. We also show in Appendix 8 that bidder n
with value v is indiﬀerent among all bids in [c,r−1 (v)].
Although the FOC’s are the same as in a common-value model42,t h e
literature on this model is less useful here, since it does not provide explicit
expressions for the equilibrium strategies43. It is rather the methods devel-
oped for the FPA without resale and with heterogeneous bidders that allow us
to prove Theorem 4 (i,ii) below. The proof in Appendix 9 of the existence
in (i) proceeds by studying the solution to the system (19,20) with initial
condition α(d)=γ (d)=η,w h e r eη is a parameter such that η<dand
which, when the inverses β,δ form a PBE, is the bidders’ common bid at d .
Because the system (properly rewritten) is locally Lipchitz at such an initial
condition, the standard theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations applies and
implies that any solution, where deﬁned, is strictly monotonic, and such that
H(γ(b))
F(α(b)) is nondecreasing and α ≤ γ. Moreover, the functions α,γ and the
lower extremity b(η) of their largest deﬁnition interval are monotonic with
respect to η. We then prove that there exist some values η of the parameter
42Where the common value as a function of the signals is
ρ(max1≤i≤n−1 vi,max1≤i≤n vi).
43From (19,20), if the bid distributions were identical, F and H would be equal, which
is impossible by assumption (iv).
38such that b(η) >cand others such that b(η) <c . Finally, we show that
there exists an intermediate value of the parameter such that b(η)=c and,
the remaining suﬃcient condition for a PBE, α(c)=γ (c)=c is satisﬁed.
To this end, we rule out jumps, due to small decreases of η, of the graphs
of the functions α,γ from common points on the 45-degree line, where they
end up when b(η) >c , to points to the vertical of and away from (c,c).
To prove the uniqueness in (i), we transform in Appendix 9 the system
(19,20) into a diﬀerential system in ϕ = γβ and β. We then show that, if
there existed two PBE’s, the function ϕ that would correspond to the higher
value of the parameter η would be smaller. Then, the value β (d), through its
positive relation with ϕ (obtained by integrating (20)) would also be smaller,
which would contradict the initial condition β (d)=η.
In Appendix 8, we also prove Theorem 4 (iii). The randomization pro-
cedure constructs an “equivalent” behavioral bidding strategy for bidder n
and keeps the other bidders’ bidding strategies unchanged. Under FD, af-
ter bidder 1, for example, with value v1 wins and observes that bidder n’s
bn is the second highest bid, he oﬀers to resell to bidder n at the price
max(r(bn),r(β (v1)))44. If bidder j, 2 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, has submitted the
second highest bid bj with α(bj) >v 1 bidder 1 (who must have deviated
from his biding strategy) oﬀers to resell ﬁrst to bidder n at the price r(bj),
and, if the oﬀer is rejected, to bidder j at the price α(bj)45.I f α(bj) <v 1,
bidder 1 oﬀers to resell to bidder n at the price r(β (v1)).
Theorem 4:
(i) (existence and uniqueness under PD): Under PD, there exists one
and only one PBE where the bidding functions β,δ are strictly increasing,
44Bidder 1 does not include the other bidders in his optimal mechanism because, ac-
cording to the randomization procedure, bidder n’s virtual value conditional on bn is at
least equal to α(bn) and hence to the other bidders’ values. This mechanism is robust to
further resale.
45When further resale is allowed, the implementation of the optimal mechanism is similar
to the one in Footnote 41.
39such that β (c)=δ (c)=c,β (d)=δ(d), β ≥ δ, and their inverses α,γ
satisfy (19,20).
(ii) (stochastically larger bid from the strong bidder): At the PBE in
(i),
H(γ(b))
F(α(b)) is nondecreasing over (c,d].
(iii) (PBE under FD) The randomization procedure applied to the PBE
in (i) produces an equivalent PBE under FD.
Proof: See Appendices 8 and 9.
The revenue comparisons in Corollary 2 also extend46. Let the function
ψ be deﬁn e da si n( 1 5 )w i t hF and H instead of F1 and F2 and let it be
diﬀerentiable at d. At a PBE with bidding functions β,δ as in Theorem 4,
the eventual owner of the item is either the bidder with the highest value
among bidders 1 to n − 1 or bidder n, depending on whether vn is smaller
or larger than λ(max1i≤n−1 vi)=ρ(max1i≤n−1 vi,ϕ(max1i≤n−1 vi)),w h e r e
ϕ = γβ.S i n c e λ(max1i≤n−1 vi) ≥ max1i≤n−1 vi, the eventual owner is always
among the two bidders with the highest values and is hence present at the
last stage of the EA in all the PBE’s from the previous subsection. In
particular, the PBE where the function ϕw that deﬁnes the strategies at the
last stage approximates ψ over [w,d] if bidder n is one of the two remaining
bidders and is the identity function otherwise brings more revenues47.O n
the other hand, a PBE constructed from a function ϕw that approximates a
function further away from ψ than ϕ is brings less revenues48.
8. Relations with the Literature
46To prove this extension, contrary to Theorem 4, we use our assumption of strict
monotonicity of v −
1−F(v)
f(v) .
47In fact, λ is diﬀerent from ψ in every neighborhood of d since, from (19) and (20),
ϕ0 (d)=
f(d)
h(d), which is strictly smaller than 1 by our assumption (iv), and hence, from the





48So also does the “extreme” PBE, where the two last remaining bidders follow an
extreme PBE as in Subsection 3.4, and where the auction price is then the third highest
value.
40The common-value methods for the SPA were introduced and used by Mil-
grom (1981), Bikhchandani (1988), Bikhchandani and Riley (1991), Klem-
perer (1998), and Bulow et al (1999). In a common-value model, Mares
(2005) obtains the optimal mechanism as an equilibrium of the SPA, which
he selects among the multiplicity of equilibria of the SPA49.I n a c o m m o n -
value model with two bidders and aﬃliated signals, Parreiras (2006) selects,
among the inﬁnity of equilibria of the SPA, the equilibrium that is the limit
of equilibria of k-price auctions, as k tends towards zero50.T h e F P A w i t h
common value is studied in Wilson (1969, 1977), Ortega-Reichert (1968),
Rothkopf (1969), Reece (1978), Milgrom (1979 a, b), Milgrom and Weber
(1982 a); and symmetry (of at least some degree) at the equilibrium of asym-
metric common-value FPA’s was encountered in Wilson (1967), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al (1983), Hendricks and Porter (1988), Hendricks et al (1994),
Campo et al (2003), Parreiras (2006), and Cheng and Tan (2008). The
model of common value is a special case of the model of aﬃliation Milgrom
and Weber (1982 b) introduced.
While resale brings an endogeneous positive externality, auctions with
exogenous externalities are investigated in Jehiel et al (1996, 1999), Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2000), and Das Varma (2002). Kamien et al (1989) con-
sider, in a complete information model, Bertrand duopolists who compete for
a contract and bargain, under the same procedures as in the present paper,
for the terms of the subcontract.
Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) consider a common-value model with
aﬃliated signals where the bidders are speculators who resell the item to
ﬁnal consumers with no private information. They and, in a more general
model, Haile (1999) show that signalling during the SPA may prevent the
49If we applied Mares (2005)’s selection criterion to our model, we would obtain the
revenue-superiority of the SPA over the FPA when the bidders are heterogeneous.
50If we applied this selection criterion to our model, we would obtain revenue-equivalence
between the SPA and the FPA. Parreiras (2006) obtains the revenue-superiority of the
SPA because the signals in his model are strictly aﬃliated, while here the values are
independently distributed.
41existence of a separating equilibrium under FD. Signalling at auctions also
appeared in Ortega-Reichert (1968), Hausch (1986), Whaerer (1999), Goeree
(2002), and Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2002). The ratchet eﬀect is the
cause of the nonexistence of a separating equilibrium of the FPA in Whaerer
(1999), where the auctioneer and the auction winner engage in bargaining.
Under complete information throughout, Milgrom (1987), Campos e Cunha
and Santos (1995), and Gale et al (2000) study resale in auctions. Ausubel
and Cramton (1999) assume the post-auction resale to be eﬃcient. In Haile
(2000, 2001, 2003), bidders are uncertain about their own values. Haile
(2000, 2001) assumes the values become public knowledge before resale.
H a i l e( 2 0 0 3 )c o n s i d e r st h ec a s ew h e r eo n l yt h ep r i v a t eu n c e r t a i n t yi sl i f t e d
before resale and obtains expressions for the equilibria, conditional on their
existence. Haile (2003) goes on to compare diﬀerent auction formats and
bargaining procedures at resale.
Gupta and Lebrun (1999) also assume that information becomes com-
plete before resale and consider arbitrary exogeneous resale-price functions.
Through the net values for winning, their model reduces to a common-value
model. Due to the incomplete information at resale, the model of the present
paper is not equivalent to such a model.
Cheng and Tan (2008) appeal to Hafalir and Krishna (2008)’s character-
ization of the equilibrium of the FPA with resale under ND and note that
its bidding strategies form an equilibrium of a common-value model. In the
present paper, we isolate (in Lemmas 1 and 3) the properties that our model
shares with the common-value model and use them to prove our results,
including explicit characterizations of PBE’s under both disclosure regimes.
Garratt and Tröger (2006a) add to the bidders of a symmetric model
one “speculator,” whose has no consumption value for the item, and allow
for discounting. They describe an inﬁnite class of PBE’s of the SPA and
o n eP B Eo ft h eF P A . T h er e s u l t sf o rt h eS P Aa r ee x t e n d e di nG a r r a t t
et al (2006b) to the two-bidder case where all biders have strictly positive
42values (they also describe n “extreme” PBE’s in the n-bidder case). Garratt
et al (2008) construct correlated equilibria of the EA with n bidders that
dominate, from the bidders’ point of view, the truth-bidding equilibrium.
Bose and Deltas (2002, 2004) show the presence of a winner’s curse in
auctions between one ﬁnal consumer and several speculators who are not
allowed to use the information from the auction. Pagnozzi (2007 a) shows
that resale may occur at the equilibrium of a SPA that awards a project with
random cost to one of two heterogenous bidders, one with limited liability and
none with private information. Pagnozzi (2007 b) studies the eﬀects of resale
in a multi-unit auction when bidders have ﬂat demands and information is
complete.
Our model is closest to the model of Krishna (Chapter 4, 2005) and
Hafalir and Krishna (2007, 2008), where resale follows an auction between
two bidders with independent values that remain private. Krishna (Chapter
4, 2005) shows that, if the average values diﬀer across bidders, there exists no
pure PBE of the FPA under FD that results in an eﬃcient ﬁnal allocation.
Hafalir and Krishna (2007, 2008) focus on the ND regime. Hafalir and
Krishna (2008) obtain the same unique pure PBE’s of the FPA we obtain
for the two bargaining procedures at resale under this regime51.T h e y s h o w
that, if the bidders are heterogeneous, the equilibrium of the FPA gives higher
expected revenues than the truth-bidding equilibrium of the SPA. For classes
of value distributions for which the equilibria of the FPA without resale can
be characterized explicitly, Hafalir and Krishna (2007) compares the FPA’s
with and without resale.
Zheng (2002), in the standard independent-private-value model with n
bidders, and Calzolari and Pavan (2006), in a discrete two-bidder model,
51In addition to the two ultimatum procedures Hafalir and Krishna (2008) consider
“probabilistic” procedures, where the resale-price maker is chosen at random according to
exogeneous probabilities. From our Corollary 3, the auctioneer’s revenues are increasing
in the probability with which the auction winner is the resale-price maker.
43design optimal mechanisms when resale is possible52.
9. Conclusion
In the independent private value with 2b i d d e r s ,w eg a v ee x p l i c i tf o r m u -
las for PBE’s of the FPA, SPA, and EA with resale under the ND and FD
regimes. We proved our results by using three key properties our model
shares with the common-value model. We designed the randomization pro-
cedure, which allows to circumvents the ratchet eﬀect by constructing, for
each pure PBE under ND, an equivalent behavioral PBE under FD. We com-
pared the auctioneer’s revenues across auctions and bargaining procedures
at resale. We ﬁnally extended some of our results to n-bidder models.
Appendix 1







of vj is continuous at vj = αj (bi) and almost all other
vj in [c,d].
Proof: From the deﬁnition of us
i and the continuity of ρs and αi, e us
i
is continuous at vj if vj 6= ρs
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))). Assume vj is such that
vj = αj (bi) and vj = ρs
i (vi,max(vi,α j (bi))).T h e n , vj = vi. Since the
function e us
i always lies between vi and vj,i ti sc o n t i n u o u si fvj = vi and
L e m m aA 1f o l l o w s .||
Proof of Lemma 2: (i): Through the change of variables wj = αj (bi),
(8) implies

















dFj (vj),( A 1 . 1 )
for all wj in [c,d].F o r a l l w0
j in [c,d], the objective function in (A1.1), as an
integral, is absolutely continuous with respect to wj.F r o m L e m m a A 1 a n d
52Here, we focus on how resale changes particular auction procedures.
44the continuity of fj, the integrand is continuous with respect to vj almost
everywhere in [c,d]. Consequently, the derivative of the objective function










fj (wj), for almost all
wj in [c,d].S i n c e us
i and fj are bounded, the assumptions of a variant53 of
Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) are satisﬁed. From this variant and











. (i) then follows.
(ii): (ii) follows from (5, 6) and ρs (α1 (b),α 2 (b)) ≤ max(α1 (b),α 2 (b)).
(iii): us
i (vi,α j (b);b,b) is, from (5-7), equal to ρs
i (vi,α j (b)) if vi <α j (b),
to αj (b) if vi = αj (b),a n dt omin
¡
vi,ρ s
j (αj (b),max(αj (b),α i (b)))
¢
if vi >
αj (b). (iii) follows. ||
Proof of Corollary 1: (i) Assume, for example, that bidder 2 is less
aggressive at v,t h a ti s ,β1 (v) >β 2 (v),o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,ϕ(v) >v(the proof
is similar in the other case). Since bidder 2 with value v wins the auction
only if bidder 1’s value is smaller than v, no trade occurs after bidder 2
wins. Let b be a bid in (β1(ϕ− (v)),r −1 (v)). Then, α1 (b) <α 2 (b) and
r(b) < min(v,α2 (b)).
By continuity, for all v1 in a neighborhood of α1 (b), ρs (v1,α 2 (β1 (v1))) is
smaller than v and α2 (b) and hence is equal to both net values us
2 (v,v1;β1 (v1),β1 (v1))
and us
2 (α2 (b),v 1;β1 (v1),β1 (v1)). Consequently, from (9) and (10), the
ﬁrst-order eﬀect54 of a bid change from b on bidder 2’s expected payoﬀ when
his value is v i st h es a m ea sw h e nh i sv a l u ei sα2 (b). From the optimality
of b for this latter value, this ﬁrst-order eﬀect vanishes at b. Since this is
53This is the variant (which can be proved as Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal 2002
from their Theorem 1) where the requirement that f (x,.) be diﬀerentiable for all x ∈ X
is replaced by the requirement that f (x∗ (t),.) be diﬀerentiable, for any selection x∗ (.) ∈
X∗ (.) and almost all t ∈ (0,1).
54From (9) and Lemma 1 (iii), the derivative with respect to α1 (b) of bidder
2’s expected payoﬀ in the SPA is (us
2 (v,α1 (b);b,b) − b)f1 (α1 (b)), which is equal to
(r(b) − b)f1 (α1 (b)) in a neighborhod of b. From (10) and Lemma 1 (iii), the derivative
with respect to b of the expected payoﬀ in the FPA is (us
2 (v,α1 (b);b,b) − b) d
dbF1 (α1 (b))−
F1 (α1 (b)),e q u a lt o(r(b) − b) d
dbF1 (α1 (b)) − F1 (α1 (b)) in a neighborhood of b.
45true for all b in the interval (β1(ϕ− (v)),r −1 (v)), bidder 2’s expected payoﬀ
must be constant over the closure of this interval. Because it contains the
equilibrium bid β2 (v), all its elements are optimal bids.
(ii) For example, assume ϕ(v1) ≥ v1 (the proof is similar for the reversed




ϕ (v1) ≤ ϕ(v1)=α2β1 (v1).
If v2 <λ
s
ϕ (v1), bidder 2 loses the auction and refuses bidder 1’s resale oﬀer.
If λ
s
ϕ (v1) <v 2 <ϕ (v1), bidder 2 loses the auction and accepts bidder 1’s
resale oﬀer. If ϕ(v1) <v 2, bidder 2 wins the auction and no mutually





2, for all v in (c,d].
Proof: Let v1, v2 be such that c<v i <v j ≤ d,w i t hi 6= j. Subtracting
the deﬁnition (1) of ρs (v1,v 2) from vj and dividing by vj − vi,w eﬁnd:
1=





fj (ρs (v1,v 2))
Fj(vj) − Fj(ρs (v1,v 2))
vj − ρs (v1,v 2)
¶
.
From the continuity of fj at vj and the continuity of ρs, fj (ρs (v1,v 2)) tends
towards fj(vj),w h e nvi tends towards vj from below. Since the derivative of
Fj at vj is equal to fj (vj), the limit of the ratio
Fj(vj)−Fj(ρs(v1,v2))
vj−ρs(v1,v2) is equal to
fj (vj). Consequently, the factor between parentheses in the equation above
tends towards 2 and the lemma follows. ||
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : ( i ) Since the sets of bj’s for which the formu-
las in C1-C2 apply are Borel sets and since C1 obviously deﬁnes a distri-
bution, we only have to prove that the formula in C2 deﬁnes a probabil-




αir−1(w)−w is nonincreasing in vj over
[r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))] and is equal to zero at vj = ϕ+ (αj (bj)), for all bj such
that αj (bj) >α i (bj).T h e ﬁrst result follows from the strict negativity of
αir−1 (w) − w, which itself follows from the strict inequality αi (w) <r(w)
over
£
βj (ϕ− (αj (bj))),βj (ϕ+ (αj (bj)))
¤





αir−1(w)−w = −∞, remains to be proved.




ϕ+(αj(bj))−w =+ ∞,i ts u ﬃces to prove
that
ϕ+(αj(bj))−w






away from zero. Through a change of variables, this is equivalent to prov-
ing that
ϕ+(αj(bj))−rβi(w)
ϕ+(αj(bj))−w is bounded away from zero when w tends towards
ϕ+ (αj (bj)) from below.








ϕ+(αj(bj))−w . From Lemma A2 above, the latter
ratio tends towards 1
2 as w tends towards ϕ+ (αj (bj)). Consequently, the
sum is bounded away from zero and C2 deﬁnes a probability distribution55.






αir−1(w)−w, for all vj in [r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))).I t
is bounded in any closed subinterval of this semiopen interval. Moreover,
we have already proved that Fj (vj|bj) is continuous at the upper extremity
ϕ+ (αj (bj)) (where it is equal to 1). Consequently, it is absolutely continu-
ous.
(ii) Let F∗
j be the marginal distribution of values of the joint distribution
of values and bids obtained from the marginal distribution Fjαj of bids and
the conditional distribution Fj (.|.) of values on bids, deﬁned, in C1-C2. We
want to prove F∗
j = Fj.
If βj (vj) ≥ βi (vj),t h e nFj (vj|bj)=1 , for all bj ≤ βj (vj),a n dFj (vj|bj)=
0,f o ra l lbj >β j (vj). From C1, these equalities are immediate if αj (bj) ≤
αi (bj). Assume bj ≤ βj (vj) or, equivalently, αj (bj) ≤ vj,a n dαj (bj) >
αi (bj), which implies βi (αj (bj)) >β j (αj (bj)) (bidder i is more aggressive
at αj (bj)). Consequently, ϕ+ (αj (bj)) ≤ vj.F r o m C 2 , Fj (vj|bj)=1 .I f
bj >β j (vj),t h e nbj >β i (vj) and αi (bj) >v j.I f , m o r e o v e r , αj (bj) >α i (bj),







Assume next βj (vj) <β i (vj).F r o m C 2 , i f vj ≤ r(bj) and αj (bj) <
55The proof for the other bargaining procedure (see Section 4) is similar and makes use
of ∂r
∂vjρb
j (ϕ− (αi (bi)),ϕ − (αi (bi))) = 1
2.
47ϕ+ (vj),t h e nFj (vj|bj)=0 . The previous paragraph and βi (ϕ+ (vj)) =








The previous paragraph and βi (ϕ− (vj)) = βj (ϕ− (vj)) imply Fj (vj|bj)=1 ,
for all b ≤ ϕ− (vj) and hence:
F
∗









From (i), the derivative with respect to vj of Fj (vj|bj) inside the integral
in (A2.1) is not larger than 1
vj−αir−1(vj), which is bounded in a neighborhood
of vj (since rβj (vj) >v j). Consequently, F∗
j is diﬀerentiable at vj and the











Again from (i), d






which is also equal to 1








Integrating (A2.3) with respect to bj according to Fjαj over [ϕ− (vj),r −1 (vj)]













48By deﬁnition of r,w eh a v evj = ρs















j (wj) − Fj (wj)
¢
=
Fj (wj) − F∗
j (wj)
wj − αir−1 (wj)
,(A2.6)
at wj = vj.S i n c e βi (wj) >β j (wj) and thus rβi (wj) >w j,f o ra l lwj in
(ϕ− (vj),ϕ + (vj)), the equality (A2.6) holds true everywhere in this interval.













.( A 2 . 7 )
Suppose F∗




j (wj) − Fj (wj)
¢
would be strictly negative everywhere in (ϕ− (vj),v j) and, since the cumula-
tive functions are continuous from the right, F∗
j (ϕ− (vj)) − Fj (ϕ− (vj)) >
F∗
j (vj) − Fj (vj) > 0, which contradicts (A2.7). The strict inequality
F∗
j (vj) − Fj (vj) > 0 is similarly impossible. The equality F∗
j (vj)=Fj (vj)
follows.
(iii) Let e mj be the distributional strategy from (ii). Its support S is the
closure of
©




|vj belongs to the support of Fj (.|bj)
ª
.
















































,w h e r eϕ+ (v+)
is the right-hand limit limw→>v ϕ+ (w) and is equal to inf {w ∈ {d} ∪ (v,d]|ϕ(w)=w}.
49,w h e r eϕ− (v−) is the left-hand limit limw→<v ϕ− (w) and is equal to sup
(




Notice that, when βj (vj)=βi (vj), r−1 (vj)=βj (vj).
Let e Gj (.|.) be one of the regular conditional distributions such that, for all
vj,t h es u p p o r to fe Gj (.|vj) is included in the section at vj of the support S of
e mj (such a conditional can be obtained by changing any conditional at all vj
in a measurable set of Fj-measure zero). We show that e Gj (.|vj)=Gj (.|vj),
for Fj-almost all vj or, since Fj is absolutely continuous (with respect to the
Lebesgue measure), for almost all vj.S i n c e ϕ− is nondecreasing, and hence
has at most a countable number of discontinuities, we may assume that ϕ−
is continuous at vj, that is, in particular, ϕ− (vj)=ϕ(vj).
Assume vj in (c,d) is such that βj (vj) ≥ βi (vj).F r o m ( A 2 . 8 ) , e Gj (.|vj)
is concentrated at βj (vj) if βj (vj) >β i (vj). T h i si sa l s ot h ec a s ei f







= βj (ϕ− (vj)) (since
vj is a continuity point of ϕ−)a n dβj (ϕ− (vj)) = βj (vj).F r o m B 1 , e Gj (.|vj)
is equal to Gj (.|vj).
Assume next vj in (c,d) is such that βj (vj) <β i (vj) and let wj be in
(ϕ− (vj),ϕ + (vj)).F r o m βj (wj) <β i (wj) and ϕ− (wj)=ϕ− (vj), the section
at wj of S is
£
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r −1 (wj)
¤
.F r o m( i ) ,Fj (.|bj) is absolutely continu-
ous, for all bj in
¡
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r −1 (wj)
¢
. Consequently, 1− e Gj (b|wj) is equal
to
R
(b,r−1(wj)) fj (wj|bj)dFjαj (bj)/fj (wj), for all b in
¡
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r −1 (wj)
¢
and Fj-almost all wj in (ϕ− (vj),ϕ + (vj)). Substituting its value from (i)
to the density function fj (wj|bj),w eﬁnd, from B2., e Gj (b|wj)=Gj (b|wj).
Since the expression (13) is obviously equal to 1 (and continuous from the
left) at b = r−1 (wj) and is continuous from the right (the exponential is
not larger than 1) at b = βj (ϕ− (vj)), this equality holds true for all b in
£
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r −1 (vj)
¤
.
There remains to prove that (13) deﬁnes a probability distribution over
the speciﬁed support for all vj that satisﬁes the condition of B2. Since the
exponential is nonnegative, the expression (13) is obviously nondecreasing
50over
£
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r−1 (vj)
¤
. We have already noticed that it is equal to 1 at
the upper extremity of the speciﬁed support. Consequently, we only have to
prove that it is nonnegative at βj (ϕ− (vj)). However, we have already proved
that (13) deﬁnes a probability distribution (since it is equal to e Gj (.|wj))
and hence that (13) is nonnegative at βj (ϕ− (vj)),f o rFj-almost all wj in
¡
βj (ϕ− (vj)),r −1 (vj)
¢
. Since (13) is continuous over this interval, its value
at βj (ϕ− (vj)) m u s tb en o n n e g a t i v ee v e r y w h e r eo v e ri ta n d ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,a t
vj.
(iv) From C1, under the assumption of RS1 the distribution Fj (.|bj) is
degenerate at αj (bj).I f vi <α j (bj),b i d d e ri appropriates all the gains
from trade by setting the resale price at αj (bj).I f wj <v i, no mutually
proﬁtable resale exists and any price that results in no resale, such as vi,i s
optimal. If βj (vi) ≤ βi (vi),w eh a v evi ≤ αjβi (vi) and hence r(βi (vi)) =
ρs
i (vi,α jβi (vi)) ≥ vi. The deﬁnition in RS1 then gives optimal resale prices
when βj (vi) >β i (vi) and when βj (vi) ≤ βi (vi) and r(βi (vi)) ≤ αj (bj).
If βj (vj)=βi (vi),w eh a v er(βi (vi)) = vi and RS1 deﬁnes optimal resale
prices.
Assume βj (vi) <β i (vi), that is, bidder i is more aggressive at vi.T h e
case that is left to examine in RS1 is αj (bj) <r (βi (vi)). In this case,
αj (bj) <α jβi (vi) ≤ αjβi (ϕ+ (vi)) = ϕ+ (vi).S i n c e αj (bj) ≤ αi (bj) and
then βi (αj (bj)) ≤ bj = βj (αj (bj)),w eh a v eαj (bj) ≤ ϕ− (vi) ≤ vi.N o
proﬁtable resale is possible and r(βi (vi)) is optimal.





over its support [r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))]. Computing the “conditional virtual
value,” the virtual value for this conditional distribution, we ﬁnd, using (i):
wj −




for all wj in (r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))).
51If βj (vi) ≤ βi (vi), δi (vi;bj)=m a x( r(βi (vi)),r(bj)) is at least equal to
vi since r(bj) ≥ vi. Consequently, it is optimal when there is no gain from
trade. We may then assume that there exist positive gains from resale, that
is, vi <ϕ + (αj (bj)). The virtual conditional value at wj is larger than vi if
and only if wj > max(r(βi (vi)),r(bj)),a n dδi (vi;bj) i st h eu n i q u eo p t i m a l
resale price.
Lastly, since max(vi,r(bj)) ≥ vi, in order to prove the optimality of
δi (vi;bj) in RS2 when βj (vi) >β i (vi) (bidder j is more aggressive at vi)
we may also assume that gains from resale are possible, that is, that vi <
ϕ+ (αj (bj)).I n R S 2 , αj (bj) >α i (bj) and hence βi (vj) >b j ≥ βj (vj),
for all vj in (αi (bj),α j (bj)], that is, bidder i is more aggressive over this
interval. Consequently, vi <ϕ − (αj (bj)) ≤ αi (bj) ≤ r(bj) and, for all wj in
(r(bj),ϕ + (αj (bj))),
vi <α i (bj)
≤ αir
−1 (wj).
Consequently, max(vi,r(bj)) = r(bj) is the unique optimal resale price.
(v) Assume ﬁrst βj (vi) ≤ βi (vi).F r o m B 1 , Gi (.|vi) is concentrated
at βi (vi) and hence bj ≤ βi (vi). Then, δi (vi;bj)=r(βi (vi)) is immediate
in RS2. It is also immediate in RS1 when βj (vi)=βi (vi), since then
bj ≤ βi (vi) implies αj (bj) ≤ vi = r(βi (vi)). Under the assumption of
RS1, assume βj (vi) <β i (vi), that is, bidder i is more aggressive at vi.
From bj ≤ βi (vi),w eh a v eαi (bj) ≤ vi and hence αj (bj) ≤ vi.M o r e o v e r ,
αj (bj) ≤ αi (bj) implies βi (αj (bj)) ≤ bj = βj (αj (bj)). Consequently,
αj (bj) ≤ ϕ− (αj (bj)) = r(βi (ϕ− (αj (bj)))) ≤ r(βi (vi)).T h e f o r m u l a i n
R S 1t h e na l s og i v e sδi (vi;bj)=r(βi (vi)).










, or, equivalently, αjr−1 (vi) <v i.F r o m B 2 ,
the maximum of the support of Gi (.|vi) is r−1 (vi) and hence bj ≤ r−1 (vi).
52Consequently, αj (bj) ≤ αjr−1 (vi) <v i and the formula in RS1 implies
δi (vi;bj)=vi. The inequality bj ≤ r−1 (vi) immediately implies that the
formula in RS2 also gives δi (vi;bj)=vi. ||
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : ( i ) From Lemma 2 (v), the resale price and hence
the net value of the auction loser do not depend on his bid. (i.1) follows,
which immediately implies (i.2).
(ii) If αj (b) ≥ αi (b), after bidder i with value vi = αi (b) wins a tie at b,
he demands at resale δi (αi (b);b)=r(βi (αi (b))) = r(b) (from Lemma 2 (ii)
and βj (αi (b)) ≤ b = βi (αi (b))). From C1-C2, r(b) is the minimum of the
support of the conditional distribution Fj (vj|b). Therefore, bidder j accepts
this resale price with probability one and both bidders’ net values are equal
to r(b).
(iii) From the deﬁnition of the net utility and, in RS1-RS2, of δi (vi;bj),
R
us
i (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b) is equal to:
(a) If αj (b) >α i (b):
(a.1) If vi ≤ αi (b): r(b).
(a.2) If αi (b) <v i ≤ r(b): viFi (r(βi (vi))|b)+r(βi (vi))(1 − Fi (r(βi (vi))|b)).
(a.3) If r(b) <v i <ϕ + (αj (b)):
R vi
r(b) vjdFj (vj|b)+vi (Fj (r(βi (vi))|b) − Fj (vi|b))+
r(βi (vi))(1 − Fj (r(βi (vi))|b)).
(a.4) If ϕ+ (αj (b)) ≤ vi:
R
vjdFj (vj|b).
(b) If αj (b) <α i (b):
(b.1) If vi ≤ αj (b): αj (b).
(b.2) If αj (b) <v i <r(b): vi
(b.3) If r(b) ≤ vi : r(b).
(c) If αj (b)=αi (b): αj (b).
Within the domains above, the expected net utility is a nondecreasing






vjdFj (vj|b)+vi (Fj (p|b) − Fj (vi|b)) + p(1 − Fj (p|b)),
53whose solution is r(βi (vi)) ≥ vi. It is then also equal to the value of the





min(vj,v i)dFj (vj|b)+p(1 − Fj (p|b))
¾
.
In fact, the two objectives functions coincide for p ≥ vi and the latter ob-
jective function is not larger than the former for p<v i. Since the latter
objective function is nondecreasing in vi, for all p, so is the value of the
problem. The proof for (a.2) is similar (and simpler).
Moreover, the expressions above coincide at the boundaries of the dif-
ferent domains. The net expected utility is continuous in vi and hence
nondecreasing in vi everywhere.
Reorganizing the diﬀerent expressions above with respect to b,w eﬁnd,
when βj (vi) 6= βi (vi), the values below for
R
us
i (vi,v j;b,b)dFj (vj|b):
(I) If b ≤ βi (ϕ− (vi)):
(I.1) If αi (b) <α j (b):
R
vjdFj (vj|b).
(I.2) If αi (b) ≥ αj (b): r(b).
(II) When βj (vi) <β i (vi):
(II.1) If βi (ϕ− (vi)) <b≤ r−1 (vi):
R vi
r(b) vjdFj (vj|b)+vi (Fj (r(βi (vi))|b) − Fj (vi|b))+
r(βi (vi))(1 − Fj (r(βi (vi))|b)).
(II.2) If r−1 (vi) <b<β i (vi): viFj (r(βi (vi))|b)+r(βi (vi))(1 − Fj (r(βi (vi))|b)).
(II.3) If βi (vi) ≤ b ≤ βi (ϕ+ (vi)): r(b).
(III) When βj (vi) >β i (vi):
(III.1) If βi (ϕ− (vi)) <b≤ βi (vi): min(r(b),v i).
(III.2) If βi (vi) <b≤ βi (ϕ+ (vi)): αj (b).
(IV) If βi (ϕ+ (vi)) <b :
(IV.1) If αi (b) <α j (b): r(b).
(IV.2) If αi (b) ≥ αj (b): αj (b).
When βj (vi)=βi (vi), ϕ− (vi)=ϕ+ (vi)=vi and only (I) and (IV)
apply. The continuity with respect to b follows from the continuity within
54the domains above as well as the agreement among the deﬁnitions at the
boundaries of their domains. ||
Proof of Theorem 2: Up to terms constant in bi,b i d d e ri’s expected

















i (vi,v j;bj,b j)dFj (vj|bj) − bj
¶
dFjαj (bj).(A2.10)
From (12), in the FPA Fjαj is continuously diﬀerentiable and hence, from
Lemma 3 (iii), the derivative with respect to b of the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( A 2 . 9 )i s
the value at b of the integrand.
Proceeding as in the proof of Corollary 1, we obtain that the optimal bids
in E of bidder i are also optimal under FD when bidder j follows his strategy
in E0. Since these bids form the supports of the bidding strategies Gi (.|.),
i =1 ,2, E0 is a PBE under FD and Theorem 2 (i) is proved.
From (A2.10), Lemma 3 (i.2), (ii), and (iii), and the equality r(b)=b,a n y
of a bidder’s equilibrium bids in the SPA wins against bids that contribute
nonnegatively to his net expected payoﬀ and loses against those that would
contribute nonpositively. Consequently, even if he was allowed to, a bidder
would have no incentive to change his bid after learning his opponent’s bid,
a n dw eh a v ep r o v e dT h e o r e m2( i v ) .
The ﬁnal allocation in E
0 i st h es a m ea si nE. Assume, for example, that
bidder 1’s value v1 is such that ϕ(v1) ≥ v1. Then, bidder 1 bids β1 (v1) and
v1 ≤ λ
s
ϕ (v1)=ρs (v1,ϕ(v1)) ≤ ϕ(v1).I f v2 ≤ λ
s
ϕ (v1), B1-B2 imply that
bidder 2 with value v2 bids at most max(β1 (ϕ− (v1)),r−1 (v2)), which is not
larger than β1 (v1). Consequently, neglecting ties, bidder 2 loses the auction
and refuses bidder 1’s oﬀer. If v2 >λ
s
ϕ (v1), bidder 2 accepts bidder 1’s
55resale oﬀer when bidder 1 wins and there is no proﬁtable resale when bidder
2w i n s .
Any bidder with the lowest possible value c obtains the same expected
payoﬀ—zero—in both PBE’s. From Myerson (1981), the interim expected
payoﬀs are then the same in E0 as in E. From the randomization procedure,
the marginal bid distributions are the same. We have proved Theorem 2
(ii).
Since the strictly more aggressive, conditional on his value, bidder faces
the same bid distribution in both PBE’s and, from B1, submits the same bid,
his expected payoﬀ from the auction stage and his probability of winning are
also the same. From Lemma 3 (v), he demands the same resale price, which
is strictly larger than his value. In order to generate the same interim
expected payoﬀs ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr e s a l em u s tb et h es a m ei nb o t hP B E ’ s
and we have proved Theorem 2 (iii).
If the bids are not fully disclosed, a deviation from E0 by a bidder after
which he loses the auction has the same result as under FD, since, even under
FD, the resale price the auction winner demands does not depend on the bid
from the auction loser (from Lemma 3 (v)). A deviation after which he
wins the auction is at most as proﬁtable, since less information is available
to make an optimal proposal at resale. Theorem 2 (v) follows. ||
Appendix 3
The PBE’s of the SPA are somewhat independent of the value distribution
of the equilibrium resale-price maker. When, for example, ϕ(v) >vand the
auction winner chooses the resale price, the bidding strategies remain part
of a PBE if the probability distribution of bidder 1’s value is changed in a
neighborhood of v. In fact, in Theorem 1, the bids and the resale prices
the bidders submit along the equilibrium path depend only on the values of
the optimal resale price function ρs at (v1,v 2) with ϕ(v1)=v2.H o w e v e r ,
ρs (v1,v 2),w i t hv2 >v 1, is bidder 1’s optimal resale price and hence depends
56only on the distribution of bidder 2’s value. The randomization procedure
only uses the probability distribution of the equilibrium resale-price taker in
order to transform his bidding function into a behavioral bidding strategy.
Moreover, when ϕ(v)=v, whatever the value distributions are, both bidding
strategies are pure and equal (to ϕ)a tv. Corollary A3.1 below follows. In
Corollary A3.1, we assume that the buyer(seller)-virtual-value functions are
strictly increasing when the auction winner (loser) sets the resale price.
Corollary A3.1: In the SPA where the auction winner (loser) sets
the resale price, let E be a PBE as in Theorem 1 (modiﬁed as explained in
Section 4). Then the bidding strategies in E remain part of a PBE when
the bidders’ values are distributed according to F0
1 and F0
2 if F0
1 is equal to
F1 over {v1 ∈ [c,d]|ϕ(v1) <v 1} ({v1 ∈ [c,d]|ϕ(v1) >v 1}) and F0
2 is equal
to F2 over {v1 ∈ [c,d]|ϕ(v1) >v 1} ({v1 ∈ [c,d]|ϕ(v1) <v 1}).
As it can be easily checked, the results about the SPA go through when
ϕ is only assumed to be nondecreasing, instead of strictly increasing and
continuous. Corollary A3.2 below holds true when an inverse ϕ−1 of ϕ is
af u n c t i o ns u c ht h a tv lies between the limits57 of ϕ(w) for w tending from
below and from above to ϕ−1 (v),f o ra l lv in [c,d].A l t h o u g h ϕ may be
constant or discontinuous in Corollary A3.2, β1 and β2 are strictly increasing
and their inverses α1 and α2 are uniquely deﬁned and continuous. Minor
adjustments of some deﬁnitions in the previous proofs are necessary to carry
over to such a more general ϕ. For example, Corollary 1 now applies to
bidder 1 with value v such that58 limu→<v ϕ(u) <v , in which case the lower
extremity ϕ− (v) of the set of optimal bids [ϕ− (v),v], over which bidder
1 randomizes under FD, is the largest ﬁxed point w smaller than v of the
correspondence Φ(w) = [limu→<w ϕ(u),limu→>w ϕ(u)].
57With the conventions limw→c
< ϕ(w)=c and limw→d
>
ϕ(w)=d.
58It applies to bidder 2 with value v such that limu→<v ϕ−1 (u) <v .
57Corollary A3.259: The results about the SPA hold true if the function ϕ
from [c,d] to [c,d] is only required to be nondecreasing and if, in the formulas,
ϕ−1 denotes an inverse of ϕ.
We showed in Subsection 3.4 an application of Corollary A3.2 to the
function ϕ such that ϕ(v1)=θ
∗,f o ra l lv1 in [c,θ
∗],a n dϕ(v1)=v1, for all
v1 in [θ
∗,d]. From Corollary A3.1, the bidding strategies of our behavioral
PBE under FD for this function remain part of a PBE if F1 is changed to
any distribution F0
1 (with increasing buyer virtual value)60.
Appendix 4
We denote αu
i the inverse of β
u




i,w eu s et h es a m en o t a t i o n
βi for both functions. Let (v0,v 00) be a maximum open interval where bidder




j and the remark in

















j are continuous at v0.
Lemma A4.1:F o r a l l vi in (v0,v 00), δi (vi;βi (vi)) = αu
j (βi (vi)).
Proof: Suppose δi (vi;βi (vi)) >α u
j (βi (vi)). From Assumptions A6,
A7.1, A7.2, and A7.3, there exists a neighborhood (w0,w 00)×(b0,b 00) of (w,βi (vi))
that is included in the interior of the support of bidder j’s strategy and such
that vj <δ i (vi;b),f o ra l l(vj,b) in this product (see Figure A1). From the
uniqueness A2 of bidder i’s optimal price, we ﬁnd
vj <δ i (v
0
i;b),(A4.1)
59The supports of the bid distributions are not convex (intervals) when ϕ is constant or
discontinuous. Under FD, a bidder’s revised beliefs are not uniquely determined when he
observes a bid in one of the gaps of his opponent’s equilibrium bid distribution. Taking
for these beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path the particular distributions in our formulas, which
depend on the (uniquely deﬁned) inverses α1 and α2, ensures the equilibrium is perfect
Bayesian.
60If F0
1 is concentrated at c, they still remain part of a PBE and the alternative con-
struction presented in Subsection 3.4 gives the equilibrium with no discounting in Garratt
and Tröger (2006a).
58for all (vj,b) in (w0,w 00) × (b0,b 00) and all v0
i ≥ vi.
Consider the bids βi (vi) and b in (βi (vi),b 00).F r o m ( A 4 . 1 ) , b i d d e r j
with value vj in (w0,w 00) and any of these bids does not buy the item at
resale. Since, being the less aggressive bider, he does not sell it neither, the
probability that such a bidder j receives the item is the probability that he
wins the auction. Obviously, this probability is higher with the bid b then
with the bid βi (vi). This contradicts probability invariance (the proposition
in Subsection 3.5) and we have proved Lemma A4.1. ||
FIGURE A1









Proof: Assume (δi (vi;b0),b 0) belongs to the interior of the support of
bidder j’s distributional strategy. Then, αu
j (b0) <δ i (vi;b0) and, from Lemma
A4.1, αi (b0) <v i.




be a neighborhood of (δi (vi;b0),b 0) in the interior
of bidder j’s distributional strategy such that e b<β
u





∂b (vi;b0)=σ 6=0 .I f σ>0,t h e r ee x i s t sb,b


























> w>w>δ i (vi;b).
59By continuity, there exists ε0 > 0 such that w >δ i (wi;b),f o ra l lwi <v i+ε0.
If bidder j with value w>wbids b, he receives the item when bidder i’s
value is smaller than vi + ε0: when he does not win the auction, he accepts




≥ Fi (vi + ε0).I f h e b i d s
b instead, he loses the auction and refuses the resale price when bidder i’s









for all w in (w,w), which contradicts probability invariance. The proof for
σ<0 is similar. ||
FIGURE A2
Lemma A4.3: For all v in (v0,v 00),t h e r ee x i s t se b in [βi (v0),βi (v)],
such that:
(i)61 δi (v;b) is equal to αu

























such that proﬁtable resale is possible, β
l
j (δi (v;b)) =
b.
(iii) δi (v;b) is nondecreasing in b over (βi (v0),βi (v)).
Proof: Lemmas A4.1 and A4.2 and continuity imply62 that there exists
e b in [βi (v0),βi (v)],s u c ht h a tδi (v;b) is equal to αu
j (b) for b larger than e b













































A simple application of the mean value theorem shows that, when de-
creasing b,o n c e(δi (v;b),b) reaches the graph of β
l
j,t h e ni td o e sn o tg ob a c k
in the interior of the support. (ii) follows. (iii) is a consequence of (i) and
(ii). ||
61If e b is one of the extremities of [βi (v0),βi (v)], then only one of of the statements
apply over the interval (βi (v0),βi (v)).
62It is simple to prove that, when decreasing b,o n c e(δi (v;b),b) has left the graph of β
u
j
it does not come back. It follows from the strict monotonicity of β
u
j and the independence
of δi (v;b), when in the interior, with respect to b.
60Lemma A4.4: For all vi in (v0,v 00):
(i) there exists no ε>0 such that δi (vi;b) is equal to αu
j (b),f o ra l lb in
(βi (vi) − ε,βi (vi));
(ii) δi (vi;b)=αu












Proof: (i) Suppose there exists ε>0 such that, for all b in (βi (vi) − ε,βi (vi)),
δi (vi;b)=αu
j (b).L e tb be in (βi (vi) − ε,βi (vi)) (see Figure A3). If bidder
j with value vj = αu
j (b) submits b0 >b , he will not accept any resale oﬀer,
since, for all wi ≥ αi (b0), δi (wi;b0) ≥ δi (αi (b0);b0)=αu
j (b0) (from Lemma
A4.1). Consequently, his expected payoﬀ comes only from the auction stage.














j (b) − b
¢ d
db
Fi (αi (b)) ≤ 0 (A4.3).







for all b0 in (βi (vi) − ε,βi (vi)) and all v<v i such that resale is possible.
Let wj >α u
j (b) be such that the couple (wj,b) belongs to the interior of
the support of bidder j’s strategy. Then, the expected payoﬀ Pj (wj;b0) of
bidder j with value wj if he submits b0 in (βi (vi) − ε,b] is equal to:
Pj (wj;b
0)=





























max(wj − δi (αi (b
00);b
0),0)dFiαi (b
00).( A 4 . 4 )
61In fact, no resale is possible after bidder i wins by bidding above βi (wj).
Since, from Lemma A4.3, the last term in (A4.4) is nonincreasing in b0,
the derivatives of the ﬁr s tt w ot e r m sg i v ea nu p p e rb o u n do nt h er a t eo f
increase of Pj (wj;b0).W e ﬁnd:
lim sup
ς→>0







































from (A4.2, A4.3). Consequently, bidder j with value wj is better oﬀ devi-
ating from b, which cannot occur at an equilibrium.
(ii): (ii) follows immediately from (i) and Lemma A4.3. ||
FIGURE A3


















j (βi (v)), for all b ≤ βi (v) such that strictly (mutually)
proﬁtable resale is possible.










> 0 (see Figure A4). Then,
there exists vj <α u
j (β
u











.F r o m













, (δi (vi;b),b) belongs












otherwise δi (vi;b) could not be continuous in b, contradicting Assumption
A7.3; and δi (vi;b) is strictly increasing in b, otherwise β
l
j could not be contin-
62uous, contradicting Assumption A7.263. From the mean value theorem and










j (wj) > 0.
From Lemma A4.4 (ii), the expected payoﬀ Pj (wj;b0) of bidder j with


































, bidder i with
value αi (b00) demands αu




















j (b) − b
¢ d
db





j (b) − b
¢ d
db
Fi (αi (b)) ≤ 0 (A4.6).









63Since, according to Fj (.|b), there is zero probability that bidder j’s value is strictly
larger than the value αl
j (b) of the inverse of β
l
j at b, αl
j (b) must be a mas point of Fj (.|b)
in order to be an optimal resale price for bidder i.
63expected payoﬀ Pj (wj;b0) is:
Pj (wj;b
0)=






































as, from Lemma A4.4 (ii), δi (αi (b00),b 0)=αu
j (b00), for all b00 in a neigh-
borhood of β
l
j (wj),a n d ,f r o mt h eﬁrst paragraph of the present proof,
δi (vi,b 0)=αl
j (b0) and hence δi (v0
i,b 0)=αl
j (b0) for all v0










Since, from Lemma A4.3, the third term above is nonincreasing in b0,w e












j (b) − b
¢ d
db























from (A4.5, A4.6). Consequently, bidder j with value wj is better oﬀ devi-
ating from β
l
j (wj) (to a lower bid), which cannot occur at an equilibrium.
(ii) From the remark in the main text, β
l
j is continuous at v0.F o r a l l
vj in (v0,v 00), vi = αiβ
u






j is constant and equal to β
l
j (v0) over [v0,v00).
64(iii) The section at b<β
l
j (v0) of the support of bidder j’s strategy is
included in [c,v0]. Consequently, there is no proﬁtable resale after bidder i













where Gj is the cumulative function of the bidder j’s marginal bid distribu-
tion. Then,








(ii) When bidder j is less aggressive at vj, β
∗
j (vj) belongs to the support
of his bidding strategy conditional on vj.
Proof: (i):L e tvi be such that bidder i is more aggressive at vi.F r o m
Lemma A4.5 (iii), for all b ≤ βi (vi) such that proﬁtable resale is possible, the
resale price δi (vi;b) bidder i demands after winning is equal to αu
j (βi (vi)).
For all such b, we must then have:
α
u
j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
p (p − vi)(1− Fj (p|b)),(A4.7)
.S i n c e αu




j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
p
Z βi(vi)
(p − vi)(1− Fj (p|b))dGj (b).(A4.8)
Since αu
j is strictly increasing in a neighborhood of βi (vi) and the strate-





=0 , for (almost-) all







From (A4.8), we then have:
α
u
j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
p (p − vi)(Gj (βi (vi)) − Fj (p)).
From the deﬁnition of β
∗








j (βi (vi)) ∈ argmax
















, because all vj <α u
j (βi (vi)) bid
less than βi (vi). Consequently, δi (vi;b)=αu






and (i) is proved.
(ii):L e t(v,v) be the maximum open interval containing vj where bidder
i is more aggressive. From Lemma A4.5 (ii), β
l
j is constant over [v,v).
Then, because bidder j bids higher than β
l

























Moreover, since bidder j does not bid higher than β
u
j (vj) for values




























2) can be completed into a PBE as in Theorem 1 of
the FPA under ND that is equivalent to the original PBE under FD.
Proof: If bidder i is more aggressive at vi, then the derivative of bidder
64The inequality is actually strict.
66i’s expected payoﬀ with respect to b at b = βi (vi) is equal to:




j (βi (vi)) − βi (vi)
¢ d
db




j (βi (vi)) − βi (vi)
¢ d
db
Gj (βi (vi)) (SPA)
since the resale price αu
j (βi (vi)) is accepted with probability one when bidder
j has submitted βi (vi). Since it must be equal to zero, we obtain:
d
db
lnGj (βi (vi)) =
1
αu




j (βi (vi)) − βi (vi)=0 (SPA).
From Lemma 4.6 (i), αu






and from the deﬁnition
of β
∗































− b =0 (SPA)
at b = βi (vi).
Similarly, by considering the derivative of bider j’p a y o ﬀ with respect to



















at b = βi (vi).



















2) can be completed
into a PBE as in this theorem. This PBE is equivalent to the original PBE




2, the marginal bid distributions
are the same; the more aggressive bidder follows the same bidding function;
from Lemma A4.6 (i), the same resale prices are demanded when proﬁtable
resale is possible; and, from Lemma A4.6 (ii), the less aggressive bidder




2) a bid that belongs to the support of the original
PBE. ||
Appendix 5
A Class of Examples Where the Equilibrium Bid Distributions Do not
Increase When the Bargaining Power at Resale Goes From the Auction
Loser to the Auction Winner:


















(such an example obviously exists). Then,
the deﬁnitions of the seller’s and buyer’s optimal resale price functions ρs and























i the equilibrium bidding functions
of the FPA under ND when the resale price is chosen by the auction winner


































. Consequently, for small bids, both bidders’ bid
distributions shift downward if the auction winner becomes the resale-price
maker. The same conclusion applies to the PBE’s under FD obtained
through our randomization procedure.
68Appendix 6




2 F1 6= ψ.
Proof: The deﬁnitions of λ
s
ϕ and the equality ϕ = F
−1








































.( A 6 . 1 )
Assume that there exists v such that ϕ(v) >v . Suppose λ
s
ϕ and ψ are
identical over (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)),w h e r eϕ− (v) and ϕ+ (v) are as in Subsection
2.3. From (15) and (A6.1), f1 (w)=f2 (ψ(w)) and F1 (w) − F2 (ψ(w)) =
f1 (w)(ψ(w) − w),f o ra l lw in (ϕ− (v),ϕ + (v)). Because its derivative
then vanishes, (F1 (w) − F2 (ψ(w)))(ψ(w) − w) is constant over this inter-
val. However, this is impossible since it tends towards zero at the extremi-





2 F1 (w)). ||





2 F1 (v)=v,t h e nλ
b (v)=λ
s (v)=v.
Let v be such that F1 (v) 6= F2 (v). Assume, for example, F
−1
2 F1 (v) >v
(the proof when F
−1

















































.( A 6 . 4 )
(A6.3) is equivalent to (A6.1) in the previous proof. The equality (A6.5)
below is the diﬀerence between (A6.4) and (A6.3).
λ
b (v) − λ
s (v)=
¡










s (v) <ψ(v), then, from (A6.1) and (15), f1 (v) >f 2 (λ
s (v)). Sup-
pose the LHS of (A6.5) is nonnegative, that is, λ
s (v) ≤ λ
b (v). Then,
from (A6.2), F1 (v) − F2 (λ















/f1 (v) and the RHS




s (v) <ψ(v). We can similarly prove λ
s (v) <λ
b (v) if λ
s (v) >ψ(v).
Moreover, from (A6.5) and (A6.2): λ
s (v)=λ
b (v) if and only if f1 (v)=
f2 (λ
s (v)).F r o m ( A 6 . 1 ) , ( 1 5 ) , a n d v<d(since F1 (v) 6= F2 (v))65.T h e
lemma is proved. ||
Appendix 7
Corollary A7.1: When ς in (0,1) tends towards zero, the PBE of the





1 , of the SPA.
















65I nt h ec a s eo fd i ﬀerent value upper extremities d1 <d 2,w eh a v eλ
s (d1)=ψ (d1) >
λ
b (d1) and Lemma 4 holds true for all v1 in [c,d1).











,f o ra l l0 <ς<ς 0, β1 (v) increases as ς decreases.






towards the degenerate distribution concentrated at v and, consequently,




1 . Similarly, β2 (v)




FOC for Bidders 1,...,n − 1
The derivative of the expected payoﬀ of bidder 1 with value v in (c,d]
with respect to b in (c,β (v)) is:









−H (γ (b))F (α(b))
n−2 .( A 8 . 1 )
Since b<β(v),n op r o ﬁtable resale is possible with bidders 2 to n−1 and, as
a consequence, bidder 1 oﬀers the optimal resale price ρ(v,γ(b)) to bidder
n. If bidder 1 loses, the winner of the auction will make no resale oﬀer to
him, since, if bidder 1 followed his strategy β,n op r o ﬁtable resale would be
possible.
If bidder 1 increases his bid b by db,t h eﬁrst term above accounts for the
event when the bids from bidders 2 to n − 1 are smaller than b and the bid
71from bidder n is equal to b, that is, his value is γ (b).S i n c e γ (b) ≥ ρ(v,γ(b)),
bidder n accepts the resale oﬀer, conditional on this event.
The second term accounts for the event where bidder n submits a bid
smaller than b and the highest bid from bidders 2 to n − 1 is b.A g a i n n o
proﬁtable resale is possible with bidders 2 to n − 1,s i n c et h e i rv a l u e si sn o t
larger than α(b) <v .B i d d e r n accepts bidder 1’s resale oﬀer ρ(v,γ(b))
only if his value is at least as high, which occurs with conditional probability
H (γ (b)) − H (ρ(v,γ(b)))/H (γ (b)).
From the envelope theorem, in the event that bidder 1 keeps winning after
the bid raise, the ﬁrst-order eﬀect on his expected payoﬀ due to the change
of resale mechanism vanishes. The third term accounts for the increase in
the expected payment at auction.
We then obtain the inequality below:













−H (γ (b))F (α(b))
n−2 ≥ 0.( A 8 . 2 )
The derivative at b>β(v) is:
(












(α(b) − b)H (ρ(α(b),γ(b)))+






−H (γ (b))F (α(b))
n−2 .( A 8 . 3 )
Let w be the highest value among bidders 2 to n−1’s, which bidder 1 deduces
from their bids. His optimal resale auction consists in selling to bidder n if
his value is larger than ρ(max(v,w),γ(b)) and, otherwise, in selling to the
72bidder with the (highest) value w among bidders 2 to n−1 or in keeping the
item, depending on whether w is larger than v or not66.
The ﬁrst term in (A8.3) above accounts for the event when bidders 2 to
n − 1 submit bids smaller than b and bidder n submits b. The second term
for the event when the highest bid from bidders 2 to n − 1 is b and bidder
n has submitted a smaller bid67.A g a i n , t h e ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a change of
resale-mechanism in the event that bidder 1 keeps winning vanishes.
The expression (A8.3) where v = α(b) must then be nonpositive, that
is, the reverse inequality in (A8.2) holds true. Consequently, the derivative
of the expected payoﬀ with respect to b at v = α(b) exists, is equal to the
























=1 .( A 8 . 4 )
FOC for Bidder n
The derivative with respect to b of the expected payoﬀ of bidder n with





n−1 − F (α(b))
n−1 .(A8.5)
66When w>vand further resale is possible, bidder 1 can implement this optimal mech-
anism by reselling at the price wH (ρ(w,γ(b))) + ρ(w,γ(b))(H (γ (b)) − H (ρ(w,γ(b))))
to the highest-value bidder (with value w) among bidders 2 to n − 1, who will then oﬀer
to resell only to bidder n at the price ρ(w,γ(b)).
67When further resale is possible and the resale mechanism is implemented
as in the previous footnote, the second term in the factor between braces is R α(b)
v (wH (ρ(w,γ(b))) + ρ(w,γ(b))(H (γ (b)) − H (ρ(w,γ(b)))) − b)dF (w)
n−2 instead.
T h es a m eF O Cr e s u l t s .
73If bidder n wins with such a bid, there is no proﬁtable resale, since α(b) ≤
r(b) <v .I f b i d d e r n raises his bid from b to db,t h eo n l yﬁrst-order eﬀect,
beyond the eﬀect on his payment at auction, occurs when the highest bid
from bidders 1 to n − 1 is b, that is, when there highest value is α(b).I n
this case, by rasing his bid and winning the auction, bidder n saves the price
ρ(α(b),γ(b)), he would accept at resale, and the ﬁrst term above follows.
We then obtain the FOC below:
(n − 1)(r(b) − b)
d
db
lnF (α(b)) = 1.(A8.6)
Notice that when this FOC is satisﬁed, bidder n is indiﬀerent between all













n−1 − F (α(b))
n−1 .(A8.8)
System of FOC’s
The system of FOC’s can be written as (19, 20). Because the derivatives
(A8.1), (A8.3), (A8.5), (A8.7), (A8.8) above, of the payoﬀs with respect to
the bid, are nondecreasing in the value, a standard argument shows that
the system (19, 20), along with the boundary conditions β (c)=δ(c)=
c,β (d)=δ(d) and the strict monotonicity of α,δ,i sas u ﬃcient condition
for an equilibrium.
The FD Regime
74Consider a PBE with bidding functions β,δ of the FPA under PD as
in Theorem 4 (i). Under FD, apply the randomization procedure to bidder
n’s bidding function δ and keep his resale strategy unchanged. Assume that
every bidder i =1 ,...,n− 1 follows the same bidding function β and the
resale strategy described in the main text. These transformed strategies
then form an equivalent PBE.























−H (γ (b))F (α(b))
n−1 .( A 8 . 9 )
Bidder 1’s optimal resale mechanism after winning with a bid b,e v e na f t e r
observing bidder n’s losing bid, is to oﬀer bidder n t h es a m er e s a l ep r i c e
r(β (v)).T h e ﬁrst and second term follow (by the randomization procedure,
the marginal distribution of bidder n’s bid is the same as under PD). Since
it accounts for the change of the payment at auction when winning, the ﬁnal
term is obviously the same as under PD.
Because, from the randomization procedure, r(b) is the minimum of the
support of H (.|b) and bidder n’s marginal bid distribution and his proba-
bility, over all bids smaller than b, of accepting r(b) are the same as under
partial disclosure, (A8.9) reduces to the LHS of (A8.1) when v = α(b).
The derivative of bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ at b>β (v) is equal to
75(A8.10) below:






(α(b) − b)H (r(b))+






−H (γ (b))F (α(b))
n−1 .( A 8 . 1 0 )
Conditional on bidder n’s submitting b,h i sv i r t u a lv a l u ei sl a r g e rt h a nα(b)
with probability one, since, by the randomization procedure, the virtual value
at the minium r(b) of the support is α(b). After observing the bid b from
bidder n and smaller bids from the other bidders, it is then optimal to make
ar e s a l eo ﬀer only to bidder n. Moreover, the optimal resale price is the
minimum r(b) of the support, since it would be optimal if bidder 1’s value
was α(b) >v .T h e ﬁrst term follows.
If the highest bid from bidders 2 to n − 1 is b, that is, if their highest
value is α(b), and if bidder n has submitted a smaller bid, the optimal resale
mechanism consists, as under PD, in selling to bidder n if his virtual value
is larger than α(b), that is, by the randomization procedure, if his value is
larger than r(b), and to the highest bidder, among bidders 2 to n, otherwise.
By the randomization procedure again, the marginal probabilities that bidder
n accepts the resale price are the same as under PD and the second term
above follows. The reason for the third term is as in the ﬁrst case above.
The derivative (A8.10) is equal to the LHS of (A8.2) and we obtain the
same FOC (A8.4) for bidder 1 as under PD. Since bidders 1 to n make the
same bids and resale oﬀers, when they follow their strategies, the derivative
of bidder n’s expected payoﬀsa n dt h eF O Cf o rt h i sb i d d e ra r eo b v i o u s l yt h e
same.
Because the derivatives above are nondecreasing functions of the value
v, the FOC’s, which, by assumption, β and δ satisfy, are suﬃcient and the
randomization procedure produces a PBE.
76Appendix 9
Technical Extension of the Function ρ
For v ≤ w, the function ρ(v,w) is deﬁned according to (1), that is:
v = ρ(v,w) −
H (w) − H (ρ(v,w))
h(ρ(v,w))
.(A9.1)
For technical purposes, extend the function ρ(v,w) to [c,w]
2 by setting
ρ(v,w)=v+w
2 ,f o rv>w . It is then easy to check that the so deﬁned
ρ is continuously diﬀerentiable over (c,d]
2. In fact, from Assumption (ii),
(A9.1) satisﬁes the conditions of the implicit function theorem (the derivative
with respect to ρ of the RHS of (A9.1) is strictly positive). Furthermore, the
partial derivatives of the solution ρ of (A9.1) tend towards 1/2 when (v,w)
tend towards towards a couple on the 45-degree line. Since ρ is continuously
diﬀerentiable, it is also locally Lipschitz over (c,d]
2.
Lemma A9.1: ∂
∂vρ(v,w) is bounded away from zero over [c + ε,d]
2,f o r
all ε>0.
Proof: For all (v,w) with v ≥ w,w eh a v e ,b yd e ﬁnition of the extension
of ρ, ∂
∂vρ(v,w)=1
2.F r o m ( A 9 . 1 ) , w e h a v e , f o r v ≤ w:
½
2+








If, furthermore, (v,w) ∈ [c + ε,d]
2,t h e nρ(v,w) ∈ [c + ε,d]
2.F r o m t h e
equality above, we have:
∂
∂v
ρ(v,w) ≥ L(ε) > 0,
for all (v,w) in [c + ε,d]















Through the change of variables ψ1 = Fα, ψn+1 = Hγ, the system (19,






ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψ1 (b)) − b
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




(F−1ψ1 (b) − b)H (ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b)))+
(ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b)) − b)
(ψn (b) − H (ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b))))
(ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b)) − b)ψn (b)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬







(n − 1)(ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b)) − b)
.
By extending the functions F−1,H−1 into locally Lipschitz functions over
(0,1+ε),w h e r eε>0,i ns u c haw a yt h a t
1−q
h(H−1(q)) is nonincreasing over this
interval, the assumptions of the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations are
satisﬁed over the domain68. D = {(b,ψ1,ψn)|0 <ψ 1,ψ n ≤ 1,ρ(F−1ψ1 (b),H−1ψn (b)) >b }.
68The change of variables allows to apply the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations
without making unnecessary Lipschitz assumptions on the density f.
78Consequently, for every η<d , there exists one and one solution in this do-
main
Consider next the initial system (19, 20) over the domain D =
(
(b,α,γ)|
c<α ,γ≤ d;ρ(α,γ) >b
)
(the image of D by the change of variables above), with initial condition








⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




(α(b) − b)H (ρ(α(b),γ(b)))+
(ρ(α(b),γ(b)) − b)
(H (γ (b)) − H (ρ(α(b),γ(b))))
(ρ(α(b),γ(b)) − b)H (γ (b))
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬







(n − 1)(ρ(α(b),γ(b)) − b)
.(A9.3)
α(η)=γ (η)=d.(A9.4)
It follows immediately from (A9.3) that d
dbα(b) > 0, for all solution of
(19,20) in D. Moreover, at the initial condition, the derivative of γ is also
stricltyre strictly positive, in fact, from (19,20) and ρ(d,d)=d:
d
db





(n − 1)(c − d)
.
We have proved Lemma A9.2 below.
Lemma A9.2: Let (α,γ) be a solution of (A9.2-A9.4) in the domain D
79deﬁned over (b0,η].T h e n , d
dbα(b) > 0,f o ra l lb in (b0,η],a n d d
dbγ (η) > 0.
From Lemma A9.2, the solution to (A9.2-A9.4) is strictly increasing at η
and can be continued within D to the left of this point.
Lemma A9.3: Let (α,γ) be a solution of (A9.2-A9.4) in the domain
D deﬁned over (b0,η]. Since, from Lemma A9.2, d
dbα(b) > 0, for all b in
(b0,η], the function ϕ below is well deﬁned and diﬀerentiable:
ϕ = γα
−1 = γβ,
where β is the inverse of α. Then, the inequality below holds true for all v
in (α(b0),d]:
λ(v) ≤ ϕ(v);










Proof: Let v be in (α(b0),d), k be such that 0 <k<minw∈[v,d]
H(w)
F(w),a n d
let the function λk be deﬁned as follows:
λk (w)=H
−1 (kF (w)),
for all w in (v,d].F r o m i t s d e ﬁnition and k<
H(w)
F(w),f o ra l lw ≥ v,w eh a v e :
d
dv




λk (w) <w ,
for all w ≥ v.I n p a r t i c u l a r , λk (d) <dand, thus,
λk (d) <ϕ(d).
80(3) and (4) can be rewritten as follows:








(v − β (v))
H(ρ(v,ϕ(v)))
H(ϕ(v)) +















β (v),( A 9 . 5 )








(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v))
H(ρ(v,ϕ(v)))
H(ϕ(v)) +
















Suppose there exists u in (v,d] such that ϕ(u)=λk (u).S i n c e λk (u) <u ,
we have ϕ(u) <uand, consequently, ρ(ϕ(u),u) <u(because min(v,w) <
ρ(v,w) < max(v,w),f o ra l l(v,w) such that v 6= w). From (A9.5) and
(A9.6), we then have d
dv lnH (ϕ(u)) < d
dv lnF (u).S i n c e d
dv lnH (λk (u)) =
d
dv lnF (u),w et h e nh a v e d
dv lnH (ϕ(u)) < d
dv lnH (λk (u)).
From an (elementary) technical lemma, we obtain ϕ(v) ≥ H−1 (kF (v)).




Lemma A9.4: Let (α,γ) be a solution of (A9.2-A9.4) in D deﬁned
over (b0,η]. Then, the inequality below holds true for all v in (α(b0),d]:
v ≤ ϕ(v),
and
α(b) ≤ γ (b),
81for all b in (b0,η].
Proof: It suﬃces to apply the previous lemma and to notice that, under





Lemma A9.5: Let (α,γ) be a solution of (A9.2-A9.4) in D deﬁned over
(b0,η].T h e n , d
dbα(b), d
dbγ (b) > 0, d
db
H(γ(b))
F(α(b)) ≥ 0 and H (γ (b)) ≤ F (α(b)),
for all b in (b0,η].
Proof: From Lemma A9.2, d
dbα(b) > 0, for all b in (b0,η].F r o m L e m m a









is not smaller than ρ(α(b),γ(b)) −b,
and the factor between braces in the RHS of (A9.2) is not smaller than
1 − n−2
n−1 > 1
n−1 > 0.W e t h e n a l s o h a v e d
dbγ (b) > 0,f o ra l lb in (b0,η].
Moreover, from (A9.2) and (A9.3), we ﬁnd d





db lnF (α(b)), for all b in (b0,η], and consequently
H(γ(b))
F(α(b)) is nondecreasing over
this interval. Since, from (A9.4),
H(γ(η))
F(α(η)) =1 ,w eo b t a i nH (γ (b)) ≤ F (α(b)),
for all b in (b0,η]. ||
Lemma A9.6 (Monotonicity of the solution of (A9.2-A9.4) with respect
to η): Let (α,γ) and (e α,e γ) be the solutions of (A9.2, A9.3) in D and the
initial condition (A9.4) for η and e η, respectively, with e η<η . Assume
further that (α,γ) and (e α,e γ) are deﬁned over (b,e η]. Then, we have:
e α(b) >α (b)
e γ (b) >γ (b),
for all b in (b,e η].
Proof: There exists no b in (b,e η] such that e α(b)=α(b) and e γ (b)=
γ (b). Otherwise, (α,γ) and (e α,e γ) could be extended over the unions of
their deﬁnition domains and would coincide over this union. However, this
82is impossible since, from (A9.4) and Lemma A9.2 :
e α(e η)=d>α(e η).
Let b0 be deﬁned as follows:
b




00),f o ra l lb
00 in (b,e η]}.
From our assumptions and by continuity, there exists ε>0 such that
[e η − ε,e η] is included in the set in the deﬁnition above of b0.W e w a n t t o
prove that b0 = b. Suppose b0 >b . Then, by continuity and from the
observation above only the two cases below are possible:
Case 1: e α(b0)=α(b0) and e γ (b0) >γ(b0).
Case 2: e α(b0) >α(b0) and e γ (b0)=γ (b0).
We investigate each case in turn.







(n − 1)(ρ(α(b0),γ(b0)) − b0)
>
1






Then, since e α(b0)=α(b0) and d
dbe α(b0) < d
dbα(b0),w ew o u l dh a v ee α(b) <
α(b),f o rs o m eb to the right of b’, which would contradict the deﬁnition of
b0.














=1 .( A 9 . 7 )
From Lemma A9.4, α(b) ≤ γ (b).F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition (A9.1) of ρ, ρ(α(b),γ(b))−
α(b) is equal to
H(γ(b))−H(ρ(α(b),γ(b)))
h(ρ(α(b),γ(b))) and the term between braces in the LHS
of (A9.7) is equal to:
1 −





which, from our assumption (ii) is nondecreasing with respect α(b). Because
ρ(α(b),γ(b)) is strictly increasing in α(b),w eﬁnd, under the assumptions of
Case 2: d
db lnH (e γ (b0)) < d
db lnH (γ (b0)), which, together with e γ (b0)=γ (b),
contradicts the deﬁnition of b0. ||
Lemma A9.7: Let b(η) be the lower-extremity of the maximal deﬁn-
ition interval of the solution (α,γ) in D of the system (A9.2, A9.3) with
initial condition (A9.4) for the value η of the parameter. Then, b(η) is
strictly increasing when strictly above c.F u r t h e r m o r e , i f b(η) >c ,t h e n
α(b(η)),γ(b(η)) >c , ρ(α(b(η)),γ(b(η))) = b(η).
Proof: Let η be such that η<dand b(η) >c . From the de-
ﬁnition of D and Lemma A9.5, we have α(b(η)) = c,γ (b(η)) = c,o r
ρ(α(b(η)),γ(b(η))) = b(η),w h e r eα(b(η)),γ(b(η)) are the values of the
continuous extensions of the solution (α,γ) to the system (A9.2, A9.3) with
initial condition (A9.4) with the value η of the parameter. From Lem-
mas A9.4 and A9.5, α(b(η)) = c if and only if γ (b(η)) = c, in which case




Let e η be such that η<e η<d .L e t (e α,e γ) be the solution of the (A9.2-
A9.4) for the values e η of the parameter in the initial condition (A9.4). The
inequality b(e η) <b(η) is impossible. In fact, from Lemma A9.6, we have:
γ (b) > e γ (b),(A9.9)
α(b) > e α(b),(A9.10)
for all b in (max(b(e η),b(η)),η). Suppose b(e η) <b (η).B y m a k i n g b in
these inequalities tend towards b(η), we would obtain e γ (b(η)) ≤ γ (b(η))
and e α(b(η)) ≤ α(b(η)) and, consequently, b(η)=ρ(α(b(η)),γ(b(η))) ≥
ρ(α(b(e η)),γ(b(e η))) = b(e η), a contradiction.
We have proved b(η) ≤ b(e η). We now prove b(η) <b (e η) by showing
that the equality b(η)=b(e η) is impossible. Suppose b(η)=b(e η).W e t h e n
have, from the deﬁnition of D and from (A9.9) and (A9.10):
e γ (b(η)) ≤ γ (b(η))
e α(b(η)) ≤ α(b(η))
ρ(e α(b(η)),e γ (b(η))) = ρ(α(b(η)),γ(b(η))) = b(η).
Since ρ is strictly increasing, we ﬁnd:
e γ (b(η)) = γ (b(η))
e α(b(η)) = α(b(η)). (A9.11)






(n − 1)(ρ(α(b),γ(b)) − b)
<
1





for all b in (b(η),η], and, consequently,
F(α(b))
F(e α(b)) is strictly decreasing over this
interval.
From (A9.8) and (A9.11), we have
F(α(b(η)))
F(e α(b(η))) =1 .T h u s , α(b) < e α(b),f o r
all b in (b(η),η], which contradicts Lemma A9.6. ||
In what follows, b(η) is as deﬁned in Lemma A9.7. The sub-lemma
below is helpful in the proof of Lemma A9.8.
Sub-lemma A9.1: For all v in (α(b),d],w i t hϕ = γβ and b ≥ b(η):
(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v))F (v)




















Proof: From (A9.3), we have:


















for all v in (α(b),d],w i t hϕ = γβ and b ≥ b(η). Integrating this equation
from α(b) to v in (α(b),d],w eﬁnd:
(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v))F (v)









(A9.12) then follows. Integrating (A9.12) by parts, we ﬁnd (A9.13). ||
Lemma A9.8:
(i) For all η ≤ c, we have b(η) ≤ c;







, we have b(η) >c .
Proof: (i) If η ≤ c, then, since (η,d,d) belongs D, Lemma A9.5 implies
that there exists a strictly increasing solution of (A9.2-A9.4) that can be
continued strictly to the left of η. Consequently, b(η) <cand (i) is proved.







.W e s h o w
that b(η) >c .S u p p o s e t h a t b(η) ≤ c, instead. From (A9.13) in Sub-lemma


































and η ≤ d −
R d
c H (w)
n−1 dw, which contradicts our initial assumption. ||
Let η∗ be deﬁned as follows:
η
∗ =i n f{η<d |b(η) ≥ c}.
From Lemma A9.8 (ii), the set in the deﬁnition of η∗ is not empty and:
c ≤ η





Lemma A9.9: Let (α(b;η),γ(b;η)) be the solution of (A9.2-A9.4) in









for all b ∈ (c,b(η∗)).
88Proof: For all η ≤ η∗,w eh a v e(c,b(η∗)) is included the (interior) of the











∗),( A 9 . 1 5 )
for all b in this interval, where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma A9.4,
the second from Lemma A9.5, the third from Lemma A9.6, and the the
equality from Lemmas A9.7, A9.4, and A9.5.
Let b be in (c,b(η∗)).S u p p o s e limη→<η∗ α(b) does not exist or is diﬀerent









for all k ≥ 1.
Let ε be a strictly positive number. Let (α,γ) be a solution deﬁned over










⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
n − 1 − (n − 2)
(v − β (v))H (ρ(v,ϕ(v)))+
(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v))
(H (ϕ(v)) − H (ρ(v,ϕ(v))))
(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v))H (ϕ(v))
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬




β (v)=( n − 1)
f (v)
F (v)
(ρ(v,ϕ(v)) − β (v)).(A9.17)
Through the change of variables (p,χ,ζ)=( F (v),HϕF−1,βF−1), the sys-







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
n − 1 − (n − 2)
(F−1 (p) − ζ (p))H (ρ(F−1 (p),χ(p)))+
(ρ(F−1 (p),χ(p)) − ρ(p))
(χ(p) − H (ρ(F−1 (p),χ(p))))
(ρ(F−1 (p),χ(p)) − ρ(p))χ(p)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
















and (HϕF−1,βF−1) is a solution over (F (α(b)),1] to thissyet and the initial
condition below:
χ(1) = 1,ρ(1) = η.
For the sake of convenience, denote (α∗,γ∗) the solution to (A9.2-A9.4)
90for η∗.L e t w be strictly larger than α∗ (b(η∗)) such that:
|ρ(w,ϕ
∗ (w)) − β
∗ (w)| <ε
(such a w exists since, from Lemmas A9.7, A9.4, and A9.5, ρ(α∗ (b(η∗)),ϕ ∗ (α∗ (b(η∗)))) =
β
∗ (α∗ (b(η∗)))). From the continuity of the solution to the system with initial
condition above and the continuity of H−1 and ρ, for all ε0 > 0,t h e r ee x i s t s
δ>0, such that ζ and χ is deﬁned at F (w), and thus β and ϕ = H−1χF
are deﬁned at w,a n ds u c ht h a t :
|ζ (F (w)) − ζ
∗ (F (w))|


















for all η such that η∗ − δ<η<η ∗ (proceeding in this way, through the
system (A9.18, A9.19) avoids making Lipschitz conditions on f).







≤ ρ(w,ϕ(w)) − β (w)
≤ 3ε,
for all k ≥ 1 such that η∗ − δ<η k.















where L is a strictly positive lower bound of ∂
∂vρ(v,w) over [v0,d]
2.T h i s
inequality must hold for all ε>0, which is cl;early impossible since the LHS




for all b in (c,b(η∗)). From the inequalities (A9.15), we then ﬁnd limη→<η∗ ρ(α(b;η),γ(b;η)) =
b(η∗) and, consequently (because ρ is continuous and strictly increasing),




and the solution of (A9.2-A9.4) for the value η∗ of the parameter satisﬁes
the boundary conditions β (c)=δ(c)=c,β (d)=δ(d).
Proof: Suppose that, as in Lemma A9.9, b(η∗) >c .F o r η ≤ η∗,
consider the function below:
ln(b(η
∗) − b)+nlnF (α(b;η)),( A 9 . 2 0 )
which is deﬁned for b in (c,b(η∗)) ⊆ (b(η),b(η∗)).L e t b0 be in this interval
(c,b(η∗)).L e t ε be a (small) strictly positive number. Since, from Lemma
A9.9, we have limη→<η∗ ρ(α(b;η),γ(b;η)) = limη→<η∗ α(b;η)=b(η∗),f o r
92all b in (c,b(η∗)), there exists δ>0 such that
|F (α(b(η





∗) − ε/2,( A 9 . 2 1 )
for all η such that η∗ − δ<η<η ∗.
From (A9.3), the derivative, with respect to b, −1
b(η∗)−b +n d
db lnF (α(b;η))

























for all η such that η∗ − δ<η<η ∗.
Since b(η∗)−b ≥ ε and, from (A9.21), ρ(α(b;η),γ(b;η))−b ≥ ρ(α(b0;η),γ(b0;η))−
(b(η∗) − ε) ≥ ε/2 over the integration interval in (A9.22), we have the fol-
lowing bound over this interval:
































≤ lnε + nln{F (b(η
∗)) + ε}.
93Since this inequality holds for all ε>0,w eo b t a i nln(b(η∗) − b0)+nlnF (b(η∗)) =
−∞ or, equivalently, (b(η∗) − b0)F (b(η∗)) = 0, which is impossible, since
b(η∗) > 0 and b0 <b(η∗). W eh a v ep r o v e dt h a tb(η∗) >cis impossible, that
i s ,w eh a v ep r o v e dt h ee q u a l i t yb(η∗)=c. ||
Lemma A9.11: There cannot exist two diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so ft h ep a r a m e t e r
η such that the corresponding solutions to (A9.2-A9.4) are deﬁned over (c,η]
a n ds u c ht h a tα(c)=γ (c)=c.
Proof: Suppose there exists two such values η0 and e η,w i t hη0 < e η<d .
Let α0,δ
0 and e α,e δ the corresponding solutions to (A9.2-A9.4). Then, β
0 =
α0−1,ϕ 0 = δ
0α0,a n de β = e α
−1, e ϕ = e δe α are solutions to (A9.16, A9.17) with
initial condition ϕ(d)=d,β (d)=η.
From (A9.16), we have d
dlnFϕ0 (d)= d
dlnF e ϕ(d)= 1
h(d). Moreover, from
(A9.16, A9.17) and the diﬀerentiability of ρ(v,ϕ(v)) and ρ(v,e ϕ(v)); d
dlnFϕ0,
d
dlnF e ϕ, d
dlnFβ, d
dlnF









































since, from our assumption (iv),
f(d)
h(d) < 1. Consequently, there exists ε>0,
such that ϕ0 (v) > e ϕ(v) and, from the initial condition β (d)=η, β
0 (v) <
e β (v), for all v in (d − ε,d).
Let v be deﬁned as follows:
v =i n f
n
v ∈ [c,d]|ϕ
0 (w) > e ϕ(w) and β
0 (w) < e β (w), for all w in (v,d)
o
.
94From the previous paragraph, v ≤ d−ε. Suppose v >c .S i n c e ϕ0,β
0 and e ϕ,e β
a r ed i s t i n c ts o l u t i o n so ft h es a m ed i ﬀerential system, the equalities ϕ0 (v)=
e ϕ(v) and β
0 (v)=e β (v) cannot both hold. Assume ﬁrst ϕ0 (v) > e ϕ(v)
and β
0 (v)=e β (v).F r o m ( A 9 . 1 7 ) , d
dvβ (v) > d
dv
e β (v), which is impossible
since β
0 (w) < e β (w) holds true over (v,d). Assume next ϕ0 (v)=e ϕ(v) and
β
0 (v) < e β (v). The factor between braces in (A9.16) can be rewritten as:









and hence is increasing in β (v). Consequently, d
dvϕ0 (v) < d
dve ϕ(v),w h i c hi s
impossible since ϕ0 (w) > e ϕ(w) h o l d st r u eo v e r(v,d).
We have proved v = c, which implies ϕ0 (w) > e ϕ(w),f o ra l lw in (c,d).




















= e β (d)
and β
0 (d) > e β (d). However, this is impossible since, from the initial condi-
tion at d, β
0 (d)=η0 < e η = e β (d). ||
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4
(i) follows from Lemmas A9.10 and A9.11; (ii) from Lemma A9.5; and
(iii) from Appendix 8.
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